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I. INTRODUCTION  
A. BACKGROUND  
By any account, the technological revolution that now characterizes the 
Information Age has firmly engulfed the world and created a global society ever 
dependent on computers and computer systems. Fueled by the concepts of data sharing 
and distributed collaboration, the diverse community of isolated computers and networks 
has evolved into a meshed architecture of interconnected networks known more 
familiarly as the Internet. The progeny of ARPANET project designers, today’s Internet 
has become a complex, nodal-structured, multi-tiered network of interconnected systems 
that serves the core functionality of moving packetized data from source to destination 
quickly and flexibly. 
 As dependence on the Internet has increased, the requirement to protect the 
systems, pathways, and data contained within this architecture has emerged as a major 
priority of users, commercial industry, and governments. Articulated at the highest levels 
of U.S government, Presidential Decision Directive 63 (PPD 63)-October 1997, 
Protecting America’s Critical Infrastructures, states that, “certain national infrastructures 
are so vital that their incapacity or destruction would have debilitating impact on the 
defense or economic security of the United States”. Moreover, the significant inference of 
PPD 63 is that a national effort that transcends individual or community self-interest is 
needed to assure security of the increasingly vulnerable information content and 
infrastructure. 
Critical to understanding the security of the Internet is the recognition of the 
conditions and requirements that govern the use of the system, and the identification of 
the appropriate stakeholders responsible for translating security concepts into action 
across the distributed infrastructure. Today’s Internet stakeholders, composed of service 
providers, private network operators, academic and research institutions, individual users, 
and product vendors, generally cooperate informally to keep the overall system running 
and “protected”. In this traditional context, participating users have been singly 
responsible for their operations and defensive preparations within their own domain as 
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dictated by their own unique, often conflicting, set of requirements. Conversely, the 
higher level Internet infrastructure and diverse market of service providers, collectively 
known as Internet Service Provider’s, have emerged as the predominate influence over 
the Internet that operates under a commercial business model geared to provide 
ubiquitous access and maximum performance at the lowest cost possible. Accordingly, 
the Internet security environment has evolved under the same influences and can be aptly 
characterized as an end system or subscriber-centric approach to security and 
infrastructure protection.  
 From its beginnings, use of the Internet had always been a voluntary endeavor, 
governed by some commonly held principles and rules of etiquette that served to define 
the boundaries of acceptable behavior. However, participation in the networked system 
today is no longer considered voluntary for commercial enterprises to compete, for 
individuals to interact within society, or for governments to govern, defend, and provide 
for its citizens. Coincident with exponential growth and increased complexity, the system 
has given rise to new levels of vulnerability, in terms of degrading availability and 
reliability, made easily more exploitable by individuals, nation states, or sub-national 
threats bent on malicious intent. Despite the vast knowledge base of system 
vulnerabilities and countermeasures readily available to individual subscriber and 
network administrators, malicious hackers consistently demonstrate their ability to 
destroy and disrupt the telecommunications infrastructure and infect thousands of hosts in 
minimal time. Evidence of this pervasive trend has been most clear when one considers 
the disruption of Web based services for millions of end users that resulted from a rash of 
coordinated denial of service attacks that targeted some of the largest e-commerce sites 
during February 2000 or the litany of computer worm attacks such as Melissa, 
ILOVEYOU, Code Red, and Nimda that successively infected larger portions of the 
Internet domain space between 1998 and 2001.   
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Given the growing inefficiency of the subscriber-centric security model that 
characterizes today’s environment to shield itself against attack, coupled with the 
emergence of the Internet Service provider as the critical pathway and keepers of the 
infrastructure, it is hypothesized that the most damaging attacks, specifically distributed 
denial of service and Worm propagation, can be better mitigated with an Internet Service 
Provider’s (ISP) -centric security approach to enhance the existing layered defense 
methodology.   
 
B. OBJECTIVES 
Through a process of examining available security policy, mechanisms and 
architectures, the primary objective of this thesis is to formulate a basic understanding of 
the role that Internet Service Providers, to include military and commercial organizations, 
play with respect to Internet security. As a secondary objective, this thesis will suggest an 
alternative organizational approach necessary to enhance and extend the concepts of 
layered defense as it relates to Internet security. By matching the emerging set of 
conditions or requirements that govern use of today’s Internet within the context of 
currently available technology, this thesis will suggest potential modifications to the 
enforcement mechanisms and architectural implementations employed by ISPs that will 
further mitigate the effects of distributed denial of service (DDOS) and code propagation 
(Worm) attacks.  
 
C. ORGANIZATION 
This thesis is divided into five chapters. Chapter II examines the current types, 
roles, and operational precepts of Internet Service Providers to illustrate the aspects of 
their functional and positional control within the infrastructure. From an ISP perspective, 
this chapter will detail the dominant mechanisms and one organizational context that 
constitutes the state of Internet security intended to foster availability and reliability. It 
will conclude by identifying an emerging set of conditions affecting Internet security and 
ISP operations to form the basis of the requirement for an ISP-centric security approach. 
Considering some of the more critical threats facing future Internet security, Chapter III 
provides a detailed explanation on how the Internet infrastructure is targeted by both 
internal and external sources using the specific attack techniques associated with DDoS 
and Worm propagation. Within this context, Chapter IV identifies four enabling 
technologies that are available, but not widely deployed, that can serve as the ISP-centric 
framework to better mitigate these specific threats.  The conclusion and recommendations 
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II. EVOLUTION ON THE INFRASTRUCTURE  
A. INTRODUCTION  
Over a period of years, computers have evolved from the simple single-user 
computing environments that emphasized a stand-alone functionality to that which can 
now be characterized as largely distributed. Realizing tremendous benefits, advantages, 
and efficiencies gained from resource and information sharing, individual users, 
businesses, and governments have become functionally dependent on a network of 
ubiquitous connectivity and near absolute availability to operate at some of the most 
basic levels of social, political, and economic intercourse. Along with evolutionary 
changes in the computer processing capabilities and functionality, there has been an 
associated evolution in the computing environment that has shifted from a subscriber-
centric emphasis to a network-centric approach that puts a premium on effective 
utilization of the information that resides on or passes between systems. Best articulated 
in the expression “the right information, at the right time, to the right person”, 
information is now described as the most valuable asset of organizations today.  
 Today, valuable information is largely exchanged across an infrastructure that 
fosters redundancy to eliminate single points of failure and to ensure the utmost 
reliability in transmission. In terms of access to the infrastructure, Internet Service 
Providers have emerged as the dominant providers of critical gateways or paths to the 
infrastructure. While both the computer and computing environments have evolved with 
advances in technology and organizational concepts, the Internet security environment 
has largely stagnated within the subscriber-centric security framework to provide a point 
solution approach that has arguably failed to keep pace with the evolving network 
connectivity and associated threats represented by distributed denial of service and 
malicious code attacks against key components on the infrastructure.   
To gain an understanding of the role that ISPs play with respect to Internet 
security and how the Internet infrastructure contributes its own vulnerability in terms of 
DDoS and Worm propagation attacks, it is necessary to examine the logical and physical 
connectivity of the Internet itself.  The objective of this section is to provide a general 
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overview of the network infrastructure to underscore the scope of the ISP influence and 
points of control while identifying an emerging set of conditions that govern the 
operation of the Internet. As an extension to the emerging conditions, this chapter will 
also examine the larger context of liability that has the potential to influence an ISP-
centric approach above and beyond the technical issues of combating the denial of 
service and worm threats. 
 
B. DESCRIPTION OF CURRENT INTERNET ENVIRONMENT 
In the logical sense, the Internet has been commonly referred to as a network of 
networks. During each stage of its development, Internet design has been shaped by a 
succession of influential stakeholders who sought to impart its particular values in terms 
of functionality and security [Ref 1]. In the beginning, the academic and research 
community garnered the attention of users as they concentrated on the technology of 
internet service that fostered intellectual collaboration and scientific achievement. Then, 
the telecommunications industry regained position in an attempt to shape the data service 
itself, as evidenced in the formulation of the feature-oriented services such as the X.25 
protocol or frame relay. Today, Internet access and availability is provided by a vast, 
sometimes convoluted, array of providers and telephone companies. While the 
organizations that make up the telecommunications industry and academia have been 
established for many years, Internet Service Providers (ISP) have only recently emerged 
as the dominant influence to provide and manage the extensive physical and logical 
implementations of the Internet.  
On the immediate surface, the community of ISPs provide the switches, routers, 
and access services that link participating subscribers, both individual consumer and 
business enterprises, to the Internet. Somewhat hidden, but nonetheless just as vital, are 
the hosts of carriers (Interexchange Carriers (IEC) and Local Exchange Carriers (LEC)) 
that operate the public telephone network cabling and equipment of the 
telecommunication infrastructure that ISPs leverage against to provide national or even 
global interconnectivity. IECs are the largest of the telecommunication carriers that 
traditionally have been responsible for long-haul transport services of data and voice 
communication. Since few companies provide just long distance telephone services 
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anymore, IECs like AT&T and WorldCom have diversified into other areas to include 
becoming ISP's themselves1. LECs are the telecom companies that own and operate most 
of the actual access lines into customer homes and businesses to provide "local" level 
transport services. Many LECs have expanded capabilities beyond their historical local 
context to achieve regional and national presence. As in the case of IECs, LECs have also 
introduced Internet services as a major component of their function. For example, 
Verizon Communications began operations as a leading local phone company and has 
since expanded to become a national multi-service provider that offers long distance 
voice, data, and wireless Internet/telephone services. 
Together, these organizations constitute the underlying network architecture in 
today’s environment since the Internet's expansion outside of the university and research 
settings. However, it must be noted that clear distinctions between division of labor, 
titles, and responsibility are constantly changing in response to the rapid growth of an 
industry dominated by market-based companies seeking to balance the myriad of 
economic forces and cost-revenue calculations.  
 
1. Types of Internet Service Providers 
According to a 2001 Internet survey conducted by Nua2, it was estimated that 
approximately 6000 ISP’s operate in the U.S alone. When combined with all other 
countries, they serve to provide Internet access and assorted services to more than 500 
million hosts around the world.  Self-organized into a three-level hierarchical structure as 
Tier 1, Tier 2, and Tier 3 providers, ISP’s have been generically categorized within the 
tiered structure according to their network infrastructure and in terms of their supported 
customer base. An ISP’s network classification has come to generally refer to its 
ownership of particular elements of the Internet infrastructure (routers, cable/fiber 
backbone, etc.) or leasing capacity of its network resources (bandwidth). Customer 
classification refers to the scale of the customer base under contract, in terms of national 
or regional coverage. Alternatively, ISPs that do not own or lease their own backbone 
                                                 
1 The Telecommunications Act of 1996 lifted barriers to allow telephone companies to compete in 
both local and long distance markets as well as to provide services outside their traditional context to 
include Internet access and multimedia applications.  
2 Nua Internet Surveys located at http://www.nua.ie 
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resources but still contribute to the Internet connectivity model are commonly referred to 
as resellers. The three basic types of the ISP market include: 
a. National Service Providers (Tier 1 NSP) 
Tier 1 organizations are commonly known as national backbone providers. 
They are the ISPs that fund, install, operate, and lease capacity along the very high speed 
fiber optic cabling that spans the entire United States as illustrated in Figure 1. In this 
regard, the Tier 1 ISP is usually a subsidiary of a large IEC that is providing long distance 
connection between local or regional networks as part of its telecom business. Possessing 
a national presence level, Tier 1 providers are generally connected to all major 
interexchange points (IXP), administered by the exchange carriers, that constitute the 
focal meeting points of the Internet infrastructure and serve as the basis for contractual 
peering agreements between ISPs. Large business enterprises, Tier 2 ISPs, and various 
reseller providers usually characterize the Tier 1 customer base. Common Tier 1 



















Figure 1.   A Representative Tier-1 Internet Service Provider Backbone3 
 
b. Regional Service Providers (Tier 2 RSP) 
Tier 2 providers are generally considered the regional and even national 
level providers that connect to the Internet backbone via Tier 1 providers. Functionally, 
they are most similar to Tier 1 providers in that they also lease their backbone network to 
subscribers, but are much smaller in scale and are not considered full equals to the Tier 1 
                                                 
3 Source:  WorldCom at http://www1.worldcom.com 
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community. Tier 2 ISPs will generally establish peering agreements with the national 
service providers to transfer data traffic. In this regard, they are typically configured to 
connect at a carrier IXP or couple directly with a national provider backbone. Tier 2 
networks generally encompass a single geographic region of the country while servicing 
a more confined customer base. Accordingly, Tier 2 providers are uniquely positioned to 
offer more direct involvement with end subscribers in terms of security, customer 
training, help desk related functions, and configuration services. 
c. Resellers (Tier 3) 
The third level in the ISP hierarchy includes the Tier 3 organizations that 
are typically considered to be the “local” service providers. Tier 3 providers usually 
purchase services and capacity from larger national or regional providers and, in turn, 
resell this service to small businesses or individual residential consumers. Because of 
their relative smaller size, reseller ISP’s typically are single-sited businesses that operate 
fairly limited access modem banks and connect to the higher level tier structure using the 
lower end connection capability relative to the entire infrastructure. Tier 3 providers can 
be differentiated on the basis that they do not own significant portions of the network 
infrastructure themselves or lease its capacity.  As such, they are also the most sensitive 
to operating costs that could greatly influence attempts to incorporate security 
infrastructure add-ons. Technically, lower Tier providers (Tier 4 and 5) do exist in 
today’s internet environment but given that their operations are considered extremely 
limited, often retaining six or fewer subscribers, they are considered to be the smallest 
subset of the same reseller market and not uniquely separated for this study. Figure 2 
illustrates the levels of interconnectivity between the various types of service providers 




Figure 2.   Internet Service Provider Tiered Architecture4 
 
2. Achieving Connectivity Between Networks 
In order to provide connectivity of national scale, ISP’s interconnect with one 
another to exchange data traffic destined for their respective end-user/client base. 
Specifically, regional and local networks aggregate their dial-up, broadband, and wireless 
data traffic and systematically hand it off to upstream or backbone networks to which 
they are connected. Data packets that originate with a customer on one backbone segment 
destined for a customer on another backbone are transferred via inter-exchange points 
(IXP) located nationwide, of which there are approximately fifty in the U.S.5   
IXP’s are facility-based infrastructure components of the Internet architecture that 
provide ISPs with a common connection point to exchange traffic at both layer-2 (ATM, 
Ethernet) and layer-3 mechanisms (IP based routers). IXP’s, also referred to as Network 
Access Points (NAP), Metropolitan Access Exchanges (MAE), and Commercial 
Information Exchanges (CIX) or otherwise, are privately owned and operated by the 
various Interexchange Carriers (IEC), Incumbent Local Exchange Carriers (ILEC), 
                                                 
4 Source: http://www.ncs.gov 
5 North America (US only) figures compiled from listings at http://www.ep.net - visited January 2002 
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Competitive Local Exchange Carriers (CLEC) or the larger Tier 1 ISP’s themselves. 
Various organizations include companies such as Bell Atlantic, Pac Bell, and MCI. 
Together, these IXP facilities consist of the very high-speed local area network 
architectures (LAN) or metropolitan area networks (MAN) that interconnect the various 
ISP’s wide area network (WAN) technologies. An individual ISP is then connected to the 
IXP LAN by either high-speed routers or switches. All traffic routing and address 
information is, generally, provided by a unique IXP Route Server to the respective ISP 
routers based on one of two predefined policy agreements, either peering or transit.  
Routers located at the IXP can be configured for access in generally two ways. An 
ISP can provide and manage their own routers at the IXP using dedicated lines. 
Alternatively, they can lease routers from the exchange carrier along with any necessary 
connections. However, the responsible exchange carrier will always retain management 
of the IXP local network while offering maintenance and repair services for collocated 
ISP equipment. 
The interconnection agreements, or policies, that govern bi-directional data 
exchange at the IXP between parties are based on commercial negotiations and contracts 
to provide either peering services or transit services. These policies will determine how 
traffic is carried, transferred, monitored, or even manipulated. Depending on the nature of 
the agreement, these policies can serve as the basis to dictate priority or out-of-band 
traffic profiles to resolve traffic congestion issues. Exchange policies that govern peer or 
transit services are typically of a bilateral, multilateral, or multi-party bilateral nature. 
Bilateral agreements are those that specifically address the relationship of two ISPs at any 
one exchange point. Multilateral agreements are those that govern the behavior of 
multiple ISPs at one exchange point. Lastly, multi-party bilateral agreements are 
specialized hybrids that govern the behavior between small ISPs and larger Tier providers 
to carry traffic to other smaller ISPs, predominantly, not connected to the same local 
exchange point. In terms of Internet access, the more IXPs that an ISP is able to connect 
with only increases that network’s chance of maintaining reliable service in the face of 
heavy traffic load, attack, or periodic outage that may result from equipment failure or 
maintenance action. 
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Unlike other national infrastructure initiatives like highway or rail, these Internet 
connections are not negotiated within a context of any specific industry regulation but 
instead are entered into on the basis of simple cost-benefit analysis at each connection. 
The ISP business model is driven by three factors: to generate revenue; to maximize 
performance; and to lower costs while treating embedded security as an ancillary 
function. Peering is considered worthwhile when the traffic exchanged between ISP 
networks is roughly equal or when there is a mutual technological or commercial benefit 
such as in the case of achieving a higher quality of service or faster delivery of data. 
Conversely, peering would not be considered beneficial if there existed a large traffic 
imbalance between providers, it was technically cumbersome to achieve 
interconnectivity, or if one provider was intent on preserving a level of service 
differentiation. While multiple ISPs may be connected to any one IXP, this does not 
guarantee or imply that an ISP can exchange traffic or have knowledge of other ISPs 
attached to the same exchange point. In fact, upstream providers may make it a business 
practice to contract peering arrangements within the umbrella of legal non-disclosure.  
In the purest of peering arrangements, ISPs agree to exchange traffic with one 
another at essentially no cost. More specifically, however, this type of agreement is 
defined as the advertising of routes or Internet pathways, via specific routing protocols, 
for the associated parties and their respective customers.  In peering relationships, ISPs 
obligate themselves to broadcast all their subscriber’s routes to other parties and vice 
versa. In transit arrangements, one ISP pays for access to the upper Tier’s Internet routing 
table, the connection point, and allocated bandwidth- in essence, becoming a subscriber 
itself. In receipt, the transit provider supplies a connection to all its associated end users 
[Ref 3]. 
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 It has been noted that, in the aggregate, the ISP industry is moving toward more 
peering agreements to lower costs and improve overall network performance. This shift 
has only recently been possible given the expanding IXP market and maturations of high 
performance technologies such as gigabit Ethernet and high-end optical technologies  
[Ref 2].  With increased peering comes closer cooperation between parties, closer 
cooperation can then foster higher levels of coordination, especially in terms of local or 
infrastructure level incident response. Coupled with the fact that the top ten competitors 
generate just over 65% of all access revenues as of 20016, the implications are that 
market consolidation trends will only bolster the potential of an ISP-centric security 
approach to take hold.   
 
3. Fundamental Elements Within An ISP Network 
The final aspect in understanding the critical position that ISPs retain within the 
Internet is understanding the architectural elements behind an ISPs internal network that 
serve the purpose of achieving access to the infrastructure as well as authenticating and 
distribution of data for the subscriber.  ISP’s network infrastructure can be separated into 
three distinct areas. Figure 3 provided as an overview of an ISP’s internal network. 
a. Access Network  
The access network is that portion of the ISPs infrastructure that 
comprises the various access services and equipment used to connect subscribers to the 
Internet and ISP services from the point data leaves the local loop telephone system. 
Functionally, the access network sits between the subscriber edge networks and provides 
the ISP a point of aggregation for incoming traffic. For example, the access network will 
contain the remote access servers (RAS) that terminate the dial-up, DSL, or cable modem 
connections. 
b. Distribution Network 
The distribution network is that portion of the ISP's network that connects 
the access network to its backbone services. It will contain the Remote Access Dial In 
User Service (RADIUS) servers that contain username and password information to 
authenticate subscribers and end users. Given proper authentication by RADIUS, the 
RAS will be authorized to issue an appropriate IP address and finish the connection that 
allows the user continued routing along the internet backbone directly or via an upstream 
provider. Other services within the distribution network include the Domain Name Server 
(DNS) that can provide primary and secondary domain name resolution, E-mail via POP3 
and SMTP services, and the World Wide Web. In an effort to generate even greater 
profitability and market diversity that extend beyond basic connectivity, a growing 
population of ISPs have begun offering other revenue-generating services such as Web 
                                                 
6 Market alert summary from a Cahners In-Stat Group report entitled “2001 Business ISPs-Service, 
Size, and Share” 
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Hosting, Virtual Private Networking, Voice over IP, managed security services, and 
remote data storage (archive) that can be serviced within the distribution network.   
c. Core Network 
 The core network is that portion that provides the general data transfer 
service and connects the ISP to the wide area network (WAN) or the Internet, writ large, 
via an array of high-speed routers. Functionally, the core network is used by all the 
different applications that run over it and connects the local ISP to other ISPs at the 
central IXPs described previously. 
 
Figure 3.   ISP Internal Network Architecture 
 
4. Internet Routing and Associated Protocols 
The “network of networks” that populates the Internet is connected by an array of 
high performance routers owned by the community of ISPs previously described. The 
process and flow of data, in the form of IP datagrams, requires that the connected router 
decide the optimal path to the next router along any path or, if at the intended network 
border, find the destination host. This series of routing across the entire infrastructure is 
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facilitated by, in fact depends on, accurate dynamically updated databases or routing 
tables resident within each router. These routers are used to move traffic within particular 
networks, known as autonomous systems (AS), or between them. Functionally, the router 
will appear as a connected host and will operate intelligently based on one of three 
gateway protocols: Routing Information Protocol (RIP); Open Shortest Path First 
(OSPF); and Border Gateway Protocol (BGP). Regardless of type, all three use distance-
vector algorithms to compute routing tables locally and are considered dynamic in that 
they interact with adjacent routers to “learn” which networks or system each router 
believes is connected; and then, adjusts its table as conditions of the network change. 
When a BGP router advertises a particular route to another, several attributes are 
automatically associated with that route. These attributes are used to select or deny 
specific routes that reflect the ISP interconnection and peering policies. In terms of 
infrastructure security, the router network and associated protocols represent one of the 
major critical vulnerabilities that must be considered on balance with providing 
transparent and high performance connectivity.  As we shall see, security solutions must 
foster higher levels of resistance against fraudulent updates in a manner that internal 
security procedures can use to both track incidents and apply upstream/downstream 
countermeasures.  
  
C. STATE OF INTERNET SECURITY 
As organizations began to rely heavily upon the networked computer environment 
(Internet) to enhance the use of information, increase creativity, and foster 
communication of ideas, the importance of information and its supporting systems 
mandate that effective measures to protect that information from unauthorized access and 
destruction be employed. Accordingly, arrays of control were developed to form the basis 
of protection and security that co-evolved along with the implied requirements of the 
computing environment. The earliest days of computing, pre-1980, were characterized 
mainly by the implementation of physical controls that prevented intruders from gaining 
access to the facilities that housed the computer resources. From 1980 through the mid-
1990’s, the environment dramatically changed with the introduction of the desktop PC, 
client/server models, and a variety of operating systems like UNIX and Windows that 
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necessitated more technical measures to ensure protection. New forms of security 
controls that addressed system access, integrity, user authentication, and confidentiality 
from both local and remote entry points were introduced.  
As the computer user base and importance of rapid information exchange 
expanded, new generations of operational controls in the form of policies and procedures 
were required to manage the risk of greater exposure.  From an ISP perspective, the 
development of industry-specific best practices evolved to provide a framework for 
managing the Internet infrastructure in ways that made it “reasonably resistant to known 
security vulnerabilities” and “not easily hijacked by attackers for use in subsequent 
attacks” [Ref 4].  It is at this point that the modern mechanisms to enforce Internet 
security can be identified to capture the state of the "defense in depth" concept used by 
ISPs to defend the infrastructure. The deployment of these mechanisms can be divided 
into two distinct technology-focused phases and one, newly emerging, organizational 
context. 
 
1. First Generation Techniques 
Within the subscribers network and ISP internal configurations, point solutions 
such as firewalls, considered both a device and filtering mechanism, became the first 
generation of network security measures deployed in a perimeter defense to address the 
obvious vulnerabilities associated with access. Because of the expanding connectivity of 
computer networks to include remote users, firewalls were designed to mitigate the clear 
risks of unauthorized intrusion from the internet. The basic premise behind firewall 
technology emerged to compartmentalize the network into protected segments by 
establishing guarded gateways that serve the purpose of keeping users and information on 
the inside safe from access by non-authorized users on the outside. This strategy was 
based on the assumption that everyone inside the perimeter was trusted and everyone 
outside the gateway was not. In the ISP context, this task is considerably more complex 
given the connectivity model is based on any internet user being afforded access to 
business-related services inside of the network, a web server for instance. To implement 
reasonable identification of source traffic to counter the threat of denial of service, 
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various techniques of filtering were developed for implementation at the border routers of 
a subscriber's network and as applicable within an ISP's core network  [Ref 5]. 
a. Ingress / Egress / Directed Broadcast Filtering 
From an ISP's perspective, ingress filtering on source address is defined as 
the direction of filtering from the subscriber’s network to the Internet. Given that denial 
of service attack model, outlined in Chapter II, is constructed to preserve the anonymity 
of the perpetrator, the attacker will attempt to obscure the origin of the attack by forging 
the source address of the attacking host machine in a way that exploits the trusted 
relationship between host machines on a network. Procedurally, an ISP will filter all 
traffic coming from the subscriber that has a source address other than an IP address 
assigned to that network within the access control list (ACL) for that router. In cases 
where ingress filtering is not possible for any particular ISP, the ISP is to “encourage” its 
use within its subscriber networks as close to the individual host machines as possible.  
Egress filtering on source address, uniquely identified to acknowledge the 
perspective of bi-directional traffic, is defined as the direction of filtering from the 
Internet (ISP's network) to the subscriber's edge network. To reduce the vulnerability of 
an attack going into the customer's network from the Internet, ISPs are encouraged to 
filter traffic going into the border router that has a source address of any IP address(s) 
that have been already assigned to that customer. Further, specific policy filters on IP 
broadcasts to known broadcast addresses within internal subnets are recommended to 
limit multiplication type attacks associated with denial of service profiles. Again, if not 
possible, the ISP should encourage its subscribers to implement the technique.  
Despite the extensive documentation associated with the benefits of 
employing these particular techniques, it is suggested elsewhere that they are not widely 
incorporated across the Internet for various reasons that include general risk assessment, 
inadequate training, or improper configuration practices. A primary resistance to its use 
can be put in terms of work load for an ISP with a large presence. For example, an ISP 
handling thousands of small business accounts would need to incorporate and actively 
manage an equivalent number of entries within the router ACL. More broadly, the direct 
beneficiary of the concerted effort is not the diligent ISP that acts as the transit agent for 
the malicious traffic; yet, that ISP bears all the financial costs in manpower or potential 
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network performance degradation. Direct benefit is gained by the destination ISP network 
that achieves a security service for no added cost in performance or labor. In the case of 
universities functionally performing as ISPs for their community of users, to include: 
researchers; administration; students; home networking; and distance learning enclaves, 
mechanisms like firewalls and filters are often considered hindrances to the pursuit of 
research and academic freedom or convenience. For others, the scale of their Internet 
presence in terms of hosts and services prove challenging to field adequate IT 
departments to operate and manage, or perhaps fund.  Particularly relevant to DDoS, the 
lack of security associated with large universities has been so pervasive that many 
institutions received unwanted national recognition for hosting a majority of the attack 
zombies used to assault against Yahoo, eBay and other high profile e-commerce sites in 
February 20007.  Regardless, as currently implemented in the border router paradigm, 
this filtering mechanism remains susceptible to subversion if an attacker forges the source 
address of a host within the permitted IP filter block necessitating additional efforts. 
b. Route Filtering 
As previously described, the Internet connectivity is based on a scalable 
architecture of high end routers that continually exchange routing information (tables) 
between peers to advertise possible destinations and distribution paths between/within 
autonomous systems. These same routers may become overloaded in situations where 
excessive numbers of routing updates are exchanged in the normal course of operation. 
Beyond the context of normal failures or inherent router behavior traits, commonly 
referred to as oscillations, there exists the concern and possibility that the infrastructure is 
susceptible to subversion by hackers that could leverage this vulnerability on which to 
execute a denial of service8. As such, ISPs are tasked with implementing strong 
authentication processes [Ref 6] and damping mechanisms, known as BGP Route Flap 
Damping [Ref 7], to limit the risk of excessive loading between routers as well as any 
                                                 
7 In an interview conducted with ComputerWorld magazine (February 2001), Jeffrey Hunker, former 
Clinton administration’s director of critical infrastructure outreach program, was quoted as saying 
“Universities were a major contributor to the DDoS attack”. Many of the offending universities cited in the 
interview as facilitating the attack included prominent institutions such as Stanford University, Oregon 
State University, University of Washington, James Madison University, and The University of California at 
Santa Barbara.   
8 InternetWeek, December 2001, interview with Carlos Recalde, Director of Telecommunications at 
KPMG conducted by Rutrell Yasin. 
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downstream router that could be affected from a cascade of peer failures. RFC 2439 
makes note that this technique is being implemented within all BGP supported 
commercial products. However, continued effort to enhance the overall security of the 
routing infrastructure is being conducted in the form of revised standards project known 
as Secure BGP as a more complete solution.9  
c. Authentication/Encryption 
One of the primary mechanisms to protect the protocol updates from 
attack is through the use of router authentication. Authentication methods include both 
plain text and Message Digest Algorithm Version 5 (MD5). MD5 differs slightly from 
plain text in that no authentication key is exchanged, instead transmitting only a hash of 
the message.  Still in use today, MD5 is compatible with the family of gateway protocols 
(BGP, OSPF, RIP, etc.) and remains the primary tool to validate the authentication of 
routing updates. Without it, malicious parties can divert or analyze the exchanged traffic. 
For example, a fictitious route injected into a router could divert legitimate traffic to an 
incorrect or bogus destination. 
Encryption prevents unauthorized users or “third parties” from being able 
to read transmitted information even if they eventually gained access to it. While 
employed extensively by subscriber networks to protect data, use of encryption in the ISP 
context is largely restricted to local administrative processes such as terminal 
communications with network infrastructure devices during configuration management 
practices. 
d. Black Hole Routing 
A slight variation on the aforementioned packet filtering techniques is to 
create specific listings of static routes, the traffic intended to be removed, and forward the 
associated IP traffic into a pseudo-interface identified as Null0. This has the unique 
feature that when implemented, the Null0 interface does not forward or receive traffic 
and drops the packets in a manner that creates no associated processor overhead. 
Leveraging the inherent strength of routers to forward vice filter, this mechanism helps to 
avoid performance degradation associated with large ACLs. This is considered a drastic 
                                                 
9 Secure Border Gateway Protocol Project, http://www.net-tech.bbn.com/sbgp/sbgp-index.html 
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measure by ISPs in that all services associated with a particular site are then restricted 
vice just the offending packets.  
 
2. Second Generation Techniques 
As networks grew more complex in design and more varied by their supported 
platforms and operating systems, the security market responded by developing a 
sophisticated set of mechanisms to help proactively identify vulnerabilities before an 
intrusion occurred as well as a system to recognize when an attack was underway. These 
techniques are broadly categorized as vulnerability scanners and intrusion detection 
systems. Commensurate with the complexity and exponential growth of the Internet, two 
additional mechanisms, referred to as load-balancing and rate-limiting, have been 
employed to help mitigate the effects of denial of service.   
a. Vulnerability Scanner and Probing Programs 
Vulnerability scanners are both vendor specific and open source products 
designed to discover network vulnerabilities to known intrusion-based exploits. While 
each provides slightly different features, their primary focus has remained in 
identification of previously recorded vulnerabilities and of coarse-level risk analysis 
through the use of threat condition ranking (low, medium, high risk) profiles. Once 
known, administrators could then apply corrective software patches to eliminate the 
vulnerability or minimize its impact on the system by configuration changes. Product 
names such as TripWire, LanGuard, SATAN, and Nessus fall within this category and 
are largely deployed by subscriber networks, and some smaller service providers, to 
assess the security posture of their internal networks. However, these and other programs 
are not widely used by the ISP community to sample the state of subscriber defenses 
unless conducted within the context of their managed security service offerings to be 
detailed later.  
b. Intrusion Detection System 
Intrusion Detection Systems (IDS) based on threat profiles and 
sophisticated algorithm techniques, both rule and anomaly based, emerged to proactively 
identify and track patterns of activity that could signal potential intrusion attempts or 
misuse of information resources at near real-time levels. As in the subscriber network 
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architectures, ISPs are employing the IDS networks to monitor their access and 
distribution networks at both the host-based and network-based levels to detect and 
respond to inbound distributed attacks or malicious code.  Accordingly, the IDS was 
designed to monitor for known attack signatures and sniff out suspicious network 
behavior. When it finds unusual activity, the IDS will send an alert to designated 
operations (IT) staff in the form of pages and automated e-mails, while logging and 
reporting the intrusions progress. Subsequent to the incident, audit logs are then analyzed 
to compile forensic data for evidentiary purposes and investigation, to feedback into the 
attack pattern library, or terminate the offending connection. The bulk of the effort to 
screen audit logs is still conducted manually by many organizations. Thus, the major 
failings with the IDS implementations, as currently available, remain that (1) the 
technique does little to deal with the immediate problem or stop the attack in progress, 
and (2) dealing with the large volumes of log data that is generated from the army of 
collectors/sensors deployed in any particular scheme. These deficiencies are seen as a 
major contributor behind why participating networks do not use, or stop using, IDSs. 
Advances in the technology have begun to allow deployment of an IDS 
concept known as an Intrusion Prevent System (IPS), which looks out for the same 
signatures and anomalies, but focus equally on monitoring the behavior of network 
devices for indications of suspicious behavior. If an infected server or network device 
tries to execute a behavior out of the norm, the IPS will automatically neutralize it with a 
specific countermeasure without consideration to the type attack. The difficulty with the 
use of these technologies is in the area of accurately base-lining proper behavior of 
network machines to maintain a balance between responding to legitimate attacks and of 
acting on false positives at real time speeds.  To address these issues and others, industry 
efforts remained focused on improving overall IDS functionality. Specifically, vendors 
are introducing more sophisticated correlation engines to better link the state of the 
network as a whole. Advanced visualization processes are being added at the monitor 
consoles to gain greater insight into how the deployed sensors are performing and to 
increase operator usability. Other groups are emphasizing automated policy management 
routines to help keep pace with network capacity.  As the cost of such efforts continue to 
climb beyond the reach of many, subscriber organizations have turned to a third 
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alternative that emphasizes outsourcing of the same tasks. However, a fundamental 
limitation of an IDS approach is its attempt to provide an omniscient classifier of all 
traffic. Attempts to construct such mechanisms run afoul of the fundamental theories that 
underlie computational systems. Therefore, IDS will always be a mechanism that the 
sophisticated attacker can circumvent.  
c. Load-Balancers 
In response to the growth of World Wide Web, companies began to 
increasingly outsource their Web based presence, in the form of massive server farms, to 
ISPs under the scope of their managed services. Commensurate with these large 
architectures, load-balancers have been developed to manage the million connections per 
second requirements placed on Web servers or other resources. In essence, these load 
balancers are provided to dynamically distribute incoming requests across a group of 
servers running a common application or set of applications in a manner that the grouping 
appears to the client base as one server. Upon receipt of a connection request, the load 
balancer will pass the request to one of the servers based on specific criteria of 
availability, server health, and load handling capacity. In terms of security, the load-
balancing technology has an additive quality in that it maintains state or knowledge of 
individual sessions by source origin, connection start, connection end, and real time 
status of individual resource loading. Additionally, inherent in the design is the fact that 
the load-balancer presents a virtual IP address to the requesting Internet client, thus 
hiding the presence of all attached resources akin to the Network Address Translation 
(NAT) technology used to address the decreasing IP address pool under IPv4. Retaining 
knowledge of state parameters, the load-balancer can dynamically shift to a low-load 
server, firewall, or IDS component as warranted to mitigate availability-related attacks 
against the internal infrastructure.  
d. Rate- Limiting 
As in the case of load balancing technology, rate-limiting mechanisms are 
often considered within the rubric of dual-use security. Initially conceived to optimize 
network connectivity, in terms of meeting quality of service levels within a service level 
agreement, rate-limiting techniques were developed to control the allocation of 
bandwidth and traffic delivery rates. Otherwise referred to as traffic shaping and traffic 
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policing, development of rate-limiting within routers provides ISPs with an ability to 
restrict traffic flow outright (drop) or to prioritize it, via a queuing technique, for 
preferred handling along the core router network infrastructure. Rate-limiting using the 
traffic shaping technique controls both rate and volume by dropping packets. Closely 
aligned, the traffic policing technique makes use of packet marking so as to defer the 
decision to drop a packet to the core router network when congestion actually develops. 
The objective of traffic policing, however, is to avoid dropping packets. In order to 
provide the most flexibility, rate-limiting can be employed by routers in one of three 
methods: port rate limiting, aggregate rate-limiting, or flow basis.  
As depicted within Interface B of Figure 4, service providers desiring to 
restrict bandwidth allocation on either an inbound or outbound physical port, regardless 
of data traffic type or protocol, utilize port rate-limiting. In this manner, differential 
service, as potentially outlined in a service level agreement, can be achieved at a specific 
port to deliver varying levels of uplink/downlink capacity.  Traffic that exceeds the 
bandwidth threshold can then be dropped outright or prioritized by overwriting the "type 
of service" field within the IP protocol header. Figure 4 reflects a 600 megabit per second 
(Mbps) rate limit at the point of entry for interface B, regardless of source/destination 
address or traffic type. 
Alternately, aggregate rate-limiting can be utilized to restrict bandwidth 
consumption in terms of a specific protocol or traffic pattern based on a pre-established 
policy statement. By using traffic policing rules, limits can be applied across a multitude 
of applications based on source, destination, port number or protocol type fields within 
the IP header. Application traffic exceeding a predefined threshold can be dropped 
outright or prioritized using the "type of service" field in the IP header just as in the case 
of port rate-limiting previously described. Figure 4 reflects that given a similar 600 Mbps 
(A) interface, HTTP protocol traffic is restricted to 300 Mbps while others are sub-









Somewhat similar to aggregate rate-limiting, flow limiting adaptively 
restricts bandwidth or prioritizes traffic on the basis of a connection. Traffic policy is 
constructed to utilize source and destination addresses, port numbers, and protocol types 
of all the related packets in a stream and thereby applies an upper limit to overall 
bandwidth consumption during a particular initiated connection. This is a technique used 
often within switched routers that precede large server farms. Figure 5 depicts the total 











3. Organizational Approach To Implement Distributed Security 
 Many security programs are never adequately developed or correctly 
implemented. This can occur because a large base of network operators and end users 
often lack the requisite level of expertise to analyze security risks or perhaps the time to 
keep pace with rapid information technology change. Yet, it is fully appreciated that an 
effective security program requires a concerted effort to establish and is, by its very 
nature, difficult to maintain. Recently, organizations looking for help with their overall 
security programs have turned to outsourcing solutions that are centered on the concept 
of a managed security service provider (MSSP). This emerging trend to realign security 
responsibility, albeit in the form of a paid service, demonstrates the potential advantage 
gained from an organizational change approach to security rather than one based solely 
on technology 
The MSSP community is generally comprised of independent and spin-off 
security focused companies that have emerged largely from established security 
consulting/integration firms.  TruSecure Corp., The Salinas Group, and Counterpane 
Systems are but a few of the current providers. Similarly, the service may be provided by 
the traditional ISPs that have added point solution security devices and monitoring 
services to their list of their network management services. In both cases, MSSPs can be 
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hired to monitor and manage a variety of network components and services to include the 
range of anti-virus software/malicious code protection, firewall management, intrusion 
detection systems, perimeter scanning (penetration testing), and protected Web servers. 
With a current market share of $630 million, estimated to go to $2 billion by 200510, the 
managed security concept also demonstrates an economic model that lends itself to the 
ISP-centric approach. 
a. Advantages of the Managed Security Approach 
When integrated within the ISP context, this approach can directly link the 
ISP to evolving security requirements of its networks. The ISP can often standardize, 
through restricted support packages, the types of applications, operating systems, and 
security hardware deployed over the Internet. For example, an ISP may support only NT 
and Solaris operating systems. For software/hardware combinations, they may choose a 
Sun server with Oracle and MS Access for database platforms.  This approach can often 
limit the proliferation of untested or poorly researched equipment while bringing in 
economies of scale. Other MSSPs have demonstrated a greater degree customization by 
handling a variety of security products that can be selected from and are capable of being 
incorporated with subscriber specific security policies. In either case, economies of scale 
allow providers to set prices within the grasp of even the smallest businesses and end 
subscribers. An additional small network or home machine can typically be added to an 
already x-thousand node network with little to no upgrade in ISP resources. In addition to 
efficiencies associated with scale, standardization facilitates predictable risk and 
performance. Tracking and performing patch fixes across the homogeneous network 
remains a simpler task for administrators.  
The dual-hatted ISPs are better able to reserve contingency bandwidth 
across multiple backbone providers to assure level-of-delivery standards required by its 
customers. In a better position to employ load-balancing technologies, large and medium 
sized ISPs are uniquely suited to employ dispersed server/service strategies to ensure 
availability in face of malicious attacks.  ISPs acting in this capacity are also uniquely 
suited to respond across the entire infrastructure. In observing an attack profile, or trend, 
against one customer, they can move to protect other clients before the same happens 
                                                 
10 Source: The Yankee Group 
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again. No single network or end subscriber can develop this level of internet perspective 
to counter large-scale malicious activity. 
Lastly, an ISP offering the value added MSSP service concept allows large 
multinational organizations, who typically have major network resources widely 
dispersed around the globe, and smaller users to augment their in-house IT security staff. 
MSSPs can be better positioned to be central warehouses of extensive security related 
experience, as opposed to any particular network subscriber that may have never 
experienced an attack or becomes complacent due to the infrequency of service 
disruption. As a centralized resource to collect valuable forensic information, the MSSP 
is ideally placed to contribute to the overall trend analysis of newer availability attacks or 
forward alerts to law enforcement agencies. 
The cost to achieve well-managed security mechanisms is high and 
includes investments in hardware, software, and personnel. Given that it is difficult for 
any organization to quantify the return on investment for any major security installations, 
internet users and businesses are able to look to managed security as an economical way 
to address security for their operations. 
b. Disadvantages 
Recent economic conditions have demonstrated that outsourcing security 
has its conditional pitfalls. By the end of 2001, it was estimated that only 50 managed 
security providers remained in the market, down from an estimated 80 companies tracked 
by the Yankee Group11. It had often been the case that security focused companies went 
out of business with no contingency plan to move customers to alternate providers or to 
transition the same customer to self-sufficiency. Subscribers were subsequently forced to 
pick up the pieces following a collapse or rapidly find an alternate service to run existing, 
but often times unsupported, equipment and configuration schema. In this regard, security 
analysts have been advising organizational strategies that spread out managed security 
services among multiple firms.  
Beyond economic factors, other issues have cast an unfavorable light on 
the outsourcing approach. Most problems have been associated with the rush to market 
                                                 
11 Edmund Dejesus, “Information Security Magazine: Managing Managed Security”, January 2001. 
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by companies unprepared for the task or the problem itself. For example, initial offerings 
by some of the largest carriers centered on firewall management services. Yet, surveys 
conducted by analyst suggested that 30% of respondents felt their own IT staff members 
were more qualified than their contracted carrier representatives. In areas of Service 
Level Agreements (SLA), contracts that govern the roles and relations between provider 
and customer, the task of determining achievable levels of performance proved difficult 
for the earliest pioneers. Given that none existed previously, MSSPs and edge networks 
are still in the process of identifying the criteria and guarantees for levels of service and 
security needed to conduct operations, especially business, over the Internet. Obvious 
questions will arise in determining how much proprietary information or access to 
sensitive information is needed by the provider to ensure adequate protection for a 
customer. Further efforts will be required to determine the level of specificity required in 
a SLA to define the boundaries of incident response, routine testing, audits, and 
penetration exercises. As the managed services multiply or become more diverse, the 
SLA will also become necessarily complex and will have to incorporate provisions for 
variances based on location, penalties or refunds for violations, and incentives for 
increased performance measures.   
 
D. INTERNET REQUIREMENTS TRANSFORMED 
The Internet architecture, in general terms, has evolved in a manner that reflects 
the relative influence of all its principle stakeholders over the years. Thus far, all of the 
stakeholders can be categorized in one of five basic sectors that comprise the Internet 
community:  universities and research institutions; the competitive marketplace of ISPs; 
commercial enterprises and small businesses; the telecommunications industry; and 
lastly, the public domain.  The Internet has flourished because each of these stakeholders 
has been guided by one overarching goal to maximize connectivity, a single-minded 
purpose that has provided its own reward of global interconnectivity. However, as is the 
case of any system lifecycle, the conditions that influence its use change over time. 
Today, the goals of reliability and assured availability have risen to the forefront because 
of the relative position that the Internet has garnered within the fabric of critical 
infrastructure not to mention the financial aspects of commerce. Accordingly, new sets of 
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conditions have emerged to characterize the Internet in a manner that exceeds the 
capacity of subscriber-centric approach to effectively deal with its most disruptive 
threats. These conditions are divided into the following categories [Ref 8]. 
1. Erosion of Trust 
The quality of openness of the Internet remains one its most powerful and useful 
features. However, one need only take account of the patchwork of point solutions to 
limit or monitor the conduct of its users to recognize that the computing environment has 
long since transcended its founding principles of trustworthiness and cooperative 
behavior. Regardless of how well one subscriber node postures itself in terms of security, 
the susceptibility to attack often depends on the state of security at another node. And yet, 
they have no influence on the security condition of that node. Increasingly, complex 
software is introduced with minimal consideration to security resulting in a cycle of 
vulnerabilities and exploits. Moreover, attack trend and analysis efforts suggest that the 
time between vulnerability discovery and exploitation is rapidly decreasing [Ref 9]. As 
the basis of trust erodes between parties that still have vested interests in communicating, 
a need for intermediaries to intercede becomes required. 
2. Unsophisticated User Base 
Many network computer systems remain increasingly vulnerable to attack in part 
because various elements of the subscriber base do not implement security measures that 
are already available. This deficiency extends from individual users to some of the largest 
university and enterprise networks. This has been attributed to several reasons such as 
lack of training and awareness, high costs of implementation, and complacency.  For 
example, the migration from dial-up access to broadband services like DSL and cable has 
been ongoing for some years. However, review of open source press accountings suggest 
that many users are unaware of the vulnerability associated with the “always on” 
connection despite the availability of host based personal firewalls, procurable 
commercially or from open source forums. Worse yet, a Security Focus article described 
an event in which a national broadband service provider discouraged the use of firewalls 
on their connection because of configuration incompatibilities12. Others suggest that 
larger organizations operating a diverse array of resources as part of their heterogeneous 
                                                 
12 http://www.SecurityFocus.com/news/287, “Broadband ISPs Shouldn’t Knock Down Firewalls”, 
November 20, 2001. 
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networks simply can not keep pace with the practical process of tracking and installation 
of patches across the various operating systems and applications made available by 
product vendors. As Internet ready technology (PDAs, cell phones, game boxes, house 
appliances, etc.) become more pervasive, configuration issues will inherently challenge 
the overall security environment.   
3. Sophisticated and Ubiquitous Attack Techniques  
Attack technology is constantly evolving. In today’s environment, attack and 
intrusion techniques continue to surface that demonstrate an increasing level of 
sophistication. For example, long past is the situation in which delivery of viruses and 
Trojan horse programs occurred from exchange of floppy disks between two users. 
Leveraging the growing standardization among PC users, malicious code developers can 
efficiently reach a larger base using a disproportionately small number of tools. With 
some 90 percent of the world PC market using Microsoft Windows products, malicious 
code writers can introduce a single virus particular to the MS operating system to achieve 
a more global impact. While efficient from a management or training perspective, the 
state of standardization effectively removes a natural barrier to propagation that may have 
been present given a more diverse computing environment. In other areas, the addition of 
newer polymorphic worm engines provide hackers with an automated ability to subvert 
intrusion detection systems by creating functionally equivalent attacks with different 
signatures as they spread between hosts.  While the expertise required to develop 
sophisticated programs may extend to a relatively small group of hackers, the vast 
number of openly accessible “hacker” web sites provide access to powerful tools and 
exploits that lowers the overall barrier for entry and make it possible for the 
unsophisticated to achieve commensurate disruption. 
 While much of the focus of computer security deals with the external penetration 
by malicious users, sophisticated security attacks can be launched through a process 
defined as subversion. Subversion is uniquely identified because it involves the covert 
and more methodical compromise of the external and internal controls over the lifecycle 
of a computer system to allow unauthorized and undetectable access to system resources 
and information [Ref 10]. Subversion can involve the implanting of "artifices", Trojan 
Horse or backdoor programs, at any one of the design, implementation, distribution, 
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installation, or production phases of a computer system or software program. The 
artifices can be constructed to be completely undetectable by automated scanning 
techniques or manual inspection. One need only consider the more innocuous type of 
code known as the "easter egg" that commercial software developers embed in many 
popular software programs to appreciate the opportunity for subversion. A widely 
recognized example was the Flight Simulation program hidden within Microsoft Excel.  
4. Evolving Influence of Legal Liability 
As a major component of the critical national infrastructure, both within and 
outside the United States, the Internet must continually deliver on its fundamental 
promise of availability and reliability. In this vein, its future potential and contribution is 
governed by the level of confidence felt by participating stakeholders as they conduct 
business, of any kind, across the infrastructure.  A commonly held, but unspoken, 
confidence in the Internet has seemly been present since its inception. Arguably, it has 
been a major condition in its exponential growth. However, the 2001 request for 
information (RFI) submitted by the Director of White House Office of Cyberspace 
Security, Mr. Richard Clarke, to consider the feasibility and economic impact of a 
separate GOVNET began the serious debate regarding major Internet players 
disconnecting from the public infrastructure. 
As previously described, the direct economic costs associated with a DDoS or 
worm attack can be sufficiently large enough to cause a major financial crisis for any 
organization. But it is the loss in public trust, customer goodwill, organizational 
reputations, and spillover effects that comprise the indirect costs sufficient to undermine 
market/sector stability or, much broader, the national economic condition.  Although no 
such galvanizing attack has yet to occur in cyberspace, one need only consider the 
financial impact on the airline industry, leisure/travel industry, and U.S economy which 
resulted from the September 11, 2001 suicide terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center 
and Pentagon to gain an appreciation for the interdependence of institutional systems and 
public confidence.  
The Internet’s vulnerability and susceptibility to attack by malicious parties, 
especially in the form of DDoS and Worms, has begun to erode the requisite levels of 
individual and institutional confidence to a degree that an emerging condition of legal 
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liability, particularly for the commercial stakeholders, is making the existing security 
paradigm untenable. For example, it was reported that Washington’s state attorney 
general demanded Qwest Communications (an ISP) to refund its business and individual 
digital subscriber line customers for service disruptions following the Code Red worm 
attack13. Citing the thousands of dollars in economic losses and poor response efforts 
from the company’s technical staff, this incident illustrates an emerging consensus that 
ISPs must shoulder more of the direct burden to eliminate such attacks as well as bear 
more of the financial costs for failures in contracted availability. Should future judicial 
proceedings directly address the issues of negligence and security on the Internet, their 
rulings may influence a redesign of the Internet that makes an ISP centric approach 
sensible from a long-term financial point of view. To understand the changing 
requirements regarding an ISP’s responsibility to provide for higher levels of security, the 
foundations of tort liability are briefly explored to establish the conditions that necessitate 
the shift in the security paradigm.  Similarly, the state of the legislative environment will 
be described to contrast its influence over the Internet stakeholders to deter and defend 
against denial of service and worm attacks.  
a. Tort Liability 
In criminal law, DDoS and Worm attacks are already provisioned for 
within the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, as are most forms of malicious computer 
activity. Thus, in context of causing harm, judgments regarding liability of the perpetrator 
have been established. Tort law, however, is more broadly understood to encompass the 
legal mechanism intended to deter undesirable behavior and to compensate those 
damaged by the action. Thus, tort law encompasses protocols that are based on harm 
caused through negligence and harm caused without fault. Causing harm without fault, 
also known as "strict liability", is tightly associated with claims over defective products 
that demonstrate a danger to public use and would not generally be considered in the 
context of Internet security. Assuming no other malfeasances, an automobile safety 
airbag that fails to deploy in an accident would fall into this category. 
                                                 
13 http://www.infosecuritymag.com, Information Security Magazine, Security Wire Digest, August 27, 
2001 
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However, taking insufficient precautions against known risks has long 
been an established tenant underlying judicial findings of negligence because of three 
intertwined evaluation criteria: least-cost avoider; state of the art; and degree of control 
[Ref 11.]. In terms of security, failing to adequately defend computer networks may carry 
with it an increased level of legal liability that may compel ISPs to shoulder a larger 
responsibility for the overall Internet security posture regardless of having complete 
solutions available.   
1. Least-Cost Avoider Principle.  Within the general bounds 
of liability, the least-cost avoider principle has been adopted as an evaluation benchmark 
that seeks to assign legal liability to a party who is in the best position to know of an 
associated risk and to take the appropriate action to minimize that risk. In situations 
where no clear party can be determined, the least-cost avoider principle allows for the 
assignment of liability to a party that is simply in the position that can most cheaply 
discover who is the least-cost avoider. For example, an ISP’s Term of Service agreement 
that states that the ISP is not responsible for the content within an e-mail is an attempt to 
contractually transfer liability to the least-cost avoider, as the subscribers are in the better 
position to protect or filter their own electronic correspondence and can provide that 
filtering more cheaply. In the context of DDoS and Worm attacks, the “hacker” behind 
the event is already determined to be criminally and tort liable for perpetrating the action. 
Unfortunately, most individuals that can be held responsible would likely possess 
insufficient finances to make a victim financially whole again. However, the victim sites 
themselves and the ISPs that provide the connectivity infrastructure may eventually be 
held liable for incurred losses since they may be in the best position to payout claims 
under the normal umbrella of business insurance or large financial resources, as in the 
case of the federal government.   
2. State of the Art.  Tort Liability is also deeply intertwined 
within the concept described as “state of the art” [Ref 11]. This principle is another 
evaluation benchmark used in an attempt to incorporate a "level of sensitivity" in regards 
to the availability of cost-effective solutions or precautions.  Measures of this nature 
generally fall within the scope of current technology and the realm of best practices.  
While the current state of security is characterized by point solutions to combat malicious 
34 
attack, other technologies and procedures are just beginning to mature that could enable 
infrastructure-wide protection schemes. For example, the evolution of filter technologies 
within the Internet core routers, the wide spread deployment of network-based intrusion 
detection systems, or scope of reasonable incident response may all serve as minimal 
standard of practices. Once fully matured to be an effective counter to DDoS or even 
implemented by the majority of organizations as incomplete solution sets, the least-cost 
avoidance and state of the art evaluations may allow for the assignment of liability to the 
ISP if not adequately provided for during an attack.  Still, organizations can be found 
liable for failing to exercise reasonable duty of care, or reasonable prudence, despite their 
compliance with standard industry practices. Considered experts in a field of 
connectivity, ISPs would be expected to stay informed of related advances and 
responsible to implement changes as warranted, even if not widely used.   
 
3. Degree of Information and Control. “Degree of Information 
and Control” is described as the third evaluation benchmark that courts consider in the 
process of specifically identifying the least-cost avoider and assigning liability [Ref. 11]. 
This principle basically analyzes who is in the best position to exercise the necessary 
level of prudence and foresee potential harm. The intended targets of DDoS and worm 
attacks are often the commercial or military web hosting services and associated servers. 
Similarly, a growing number of these integrated services (information) are being housed, 
monitored, and managed (control) from within the physical and virtual facilities of ISPs 
or entirely by an ISP’s hosting division staff. Combined, these situations place the 
provider in the best position and with the most ability to prevent attacks. Accordingly, the 
ISP are conceivably more exposed under tort law if their service performance lags the 
standard of care afforded under the aforementioned state of the art analysis. Given the 
difficulty in tracing the creator of a worm, the most practical target of litigation is likely 
to be against those that failed to patch the systems.  
b. Immunity 
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Under the current security paradigm, the providers have conducted 
themselves in a manner characteristic of agents for connectivity or as an underlying 
backbone that facilitates communication and data exchange between parties. Thus, ISPs 
have argued that they should be considered beyond the reach of liability for conduct of its 
users.  In fact, the safe harbor provisions extended to ISPs within the Communications 
Decency Act of 1996 related to indecent or defamatory content and the Digital 
Millennium Copyright Act of 2000 related to copyright infringement would seem to 
bolster their position. It must be noted, however, that both of these legislative measures 
give specific statutory exemption to a registered ISP in an attempt to foster dissemination 
of content. The motive behind these exemptions is explicitly linked to the particular 
sensitivity that the U.S has in protecting freedom of speech. Additionally, both statues 
afford the safe harbor provision only under certain circumstances or conditions and are 
not considered absolute. For example, ISPs must have public policies against copyright 
infringement and remove/block instances in an expeditious manner when discovered or if 
appropriately notified. In terms of indecent content, ISPs must inform network users of 
screening software and report known violations, as defined by the Child Online 
Protection Act, or face financial penalty. Since activity associated with DDoS and worm 
attack would conceivably fall outside the context of free speech, it is unlikely that ISPs 
will be provided similar safe harbor. 
Contractual shifting risk can provide an ISP with some degree of 
immunity against liability. As a strategy, contracts can be used to shift the security 
burden onto subscribers by compelling customers to take certain precautions or shift 
responsibility by simply disclaiming it as a term of service condition.  Contracts that 
compel customer behavior to take precautions are common within the same Service Level 
Agreements that governed ISP peering arrangements or Term of Service Agreements 
used by end subscribers. Disclaiming liability, however, is considered to be non-binding 
on third parties participants, parties that do not directly sign the contract. So in the 
scenario of a DDoS, it would be unlikely that an ISP would be able to shift liability to a 
third party internet user (non subscriber of the hosting ISP) infected with zombie or 
handler programs to recover damages sought by the victim web site. Furthermore, 
disclaimers are only enforceable between signatories if they remain consistent with 
currently held public policy, appropriate jurisdiction, or considered non-coercive. Given 
an ISP’s national or global presence, contractual immunity may be inconsistently applied 
or costly to defend and illustrates that further action is warranted. 
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c. Legislative Environment 
In concert with the expanded use of the computers, Congress has enacted 
several laws that recognize the detrimental effect of malicious activity over the Internet. 
However, legislation enacted to date has emphasized the criminal law aspects of 
regulation by aiming its efforts at individuals or groups who abuse the networks for 
illegal purposes and not at other third parties who facilitate, knowingly or not, in the 
attack such as in a worm or DDoS scenario. For example, under the Computer Fraud and 
Abuse Act, persons who alter, damage, or gain unauthorized access to content on the 
network computers of the government, banking, and credit card companies are subject to 
fines, jail, or both. Further, it imposes penalties for unauthorized access to other 
computers with the intent to extort or defraud. It does not address the third party 
complicity of the computer owner that has failed to adequately protect his machine that 
was used as a surrogate in the attack. The most recent initiatives such as The Digital 
Millennium Copyright Protection Act (DMCA), Computer Decency Act, and Electronic 
Communications Protection Act only address the narrow concepts of copyright law, free 
speech, and privacy within the Internet context. 
Three newer legislative initiatives that have a dramatic impact on ISPs 
ability or desire to stay as a neutral connectivity partner have recently emerged to fill part 
of the void. Specifically, state legislatures in California and Virginia have taken up the 
issue of anti-spam and trespass law in ways that have analogous implications for DDoS 
and worm code. Spam, the Internet version of junk mail, can functionally achieve the 
same result of a denial of service against a “relay” mail server as it attempts to mass 
produce a single inbound message into thousands of copies for hosted accounts. 
Sufficient performance degradation or system crash can occur as a result of a condition 
known as bounce back, in which large numbers of undeliverable addresses, very typical 
of spam listings, cause large quantities of mail to come back to the relay server. As 
spammers attempt to disguise themselves or utilize stealth mailing techniques, 
administrative and technical costs soar at the ISP while trying to track, contain, or filter 
the offender.   
 The Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools 
Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act (USA-PATRIOT) of 2001 has greatly 
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expanded police powers to obtain customer account information and record transaction 
history from any agency providing connectivity to the Internet. As ISPs seek to comply 
with their accountability and data archival specifications, they will inherently gain 
broader monitoring capabilities necessary to “see” more of what is sent over their 
respective network infrastructure. For example, the prevailing Cable Act of 1984 
specifically prevented law enforcement wiretaps across cable communication lines or the 
ability to obtain customer account information. The PATRIOT Act has superseded this 
restriction and now governs disclosure of both voice and data services. And most 
broadly, PATRIOT provisions now allow law enforcement to obtain a single search 
warrant capable of crossing multi-state jurisdictions to collect and/or “trap and trace” data 
across the Internet infrastructure. 
 
 E. SUMMARY 
Because of the exponential growth of the Internet, the resulting network 
computing landscape shows little resemblance to the functionality and design architecture 
originally envision by its founders. Today, the Internet is heavily influenced, if not 
dominated, by a diverse community of service providers that cooperatively engage in 
mutually beneficial peering arrangements to form the critical gateways to the 
infrastructure from which users and network systems interface. In addition to providing 
the access control and linkage to other networks that facilitates global interconnectivity, 
these same service providers are increasingly operating and managing a complete set of 
services such as web servers, mail, and data storage, that have redefined their role beyond 
the transparent, best-effort delivery of packets.  
While the Internet has flourished based upon a requirement to maximize 
connectivity, the evolving usage of the Internet, coupled with an inherently insecure 
technical foundation, has given rise to a fundamental erosion of trust and decreased 
technical sophistication of users ill suited to counter the growing sophistication of threats.  
 Despite the growing importance of the infrastructure to the national aims, 
responsibility for the security of the Internet has largely remained within a paradigm 
based on trusted users to act appropriately to preserve its availability and reliability under 
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the aegis of security related to "best practices" and layered defense. Largely due to scale, 
complexity, and inherently insecure computing designs, the subscriber-centric approach 
has failed to keep pace with an emerging threat of denial of service and malicious code 
that can now leverage the distributed nature of the infrastructure itself to severely disrupt 
critical functions and services required by society, commerce, and government users. In 
contrast, the ISP community has demonstrated some of the fundamental capability to 
employ established techniques and organization concepts to prevent, detect, and contain 
the vast majority of attacks, or at least mitigate their effects until more focused 
countermeasures can be employed.   




























































III. DEFINING THE THREAT 
A. INTRODUCTION 
Interconnectivity, distributed computing, and near instantaneous speed of 
transmission are among the most powerful features of the Internet. Ironically, these 
attributes are also the qualities that jeopardize its long-term security the greatest. Hackers 
increasingly use these specific characteristics to exploit the networks of hosts that exhibit 
little to no security. Two of the more serious security threats emerging in today’s 
networking environment are the distributed denial of service (DDoS) attack and the self-
propagating Worm.  
In February 2000, eBay, Yahoo.com, Amazon .com, CNN.com, and several other 
top e-commerce sites fell victim to a DDoS which rendered their Web sites inaccessible 
to legitimate users for six consecutive days and cost the targeted companies a combined 
estimate of $1.2 billion dollars in lost revenue, additional security measures, and damage 
recovery measures. It was later discovered that a lone juvenile from Montreal Canada 
perpetrated the attack. In terms of larger market impact, the Federal Trade Commission 
estimated that as much as $15 billion dollars worth of e-commerce transactions go 
unrealized because of the lack of trust in the current business-to-business and business-to-
customer electronic relations that are susceptible to similar kinds of Internet based 
attacks. Similarly, a Gartner Group survey suggested that as much as 86 percent of 
American adults refrain from conducting personal business over the Internet because of 
security concerns. While most of what the public is made aware of comes from a few 
high profile incidents, it is believed that the majority of attacks are still not well 
publicized14. 
Since recent examples of prosecuted hackers have been juveniles, there remains a 
prevailing attitude that the reasons behind the trend are themselves juvenile or simplistic 
in nature and lack serious merit. DDoS continues to be a pervasive threat and one 
conducted with serious underpinnings as demonstrated in both March and December 
2001 when the widely recognized Internet security watchdog organization, the Computer 
                                                 
14 Computer Secuirty Institute, “2001 CSI/FBI Computer Crime and Security Survey”, Volume 12., 
No.1, Spring 2001. 
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Emergency Response Team (CERT), became a victim of a targeted DDoS attacks.  Later 
the same year, selected Department of Defense and defense industry sites were taken 
down by Chinese hackers in response to the in-flight collision between the U.S Navy’s 
EP-3 surveillance aircraft and a Chinese fighter patrol aircraft.  By attacking a recognized 
“security conscious” poster organization, the former attack served to send the larger 
message of ubiquitous vulnerability - no matter what you do, where you are, who you are, 
you can be reached. This is a message and context not unlike that which sponsored 
terrorism tries to achieve. The latter case demonstrates that such attacks are emerging as 
new forms of political and social protest. Both instances suggest an evolving threat that 
goes beyond juvenile bragging rights. Still more ominous, experts continue to warn the 
nation’s public and private enterprises of future attacks by ever more sophisticated cyber-
terrorist acting either independently or on behalf of adversarial nation states as a means to 
conduct an emerging form of cyberwar. In 1998, hackers traced to the Persian Gulf 
region tapped into the NASA network to gain access to data sensitive to the national air 
traffic control system. During the Kosovo air campaign of 1999, Serbian hackers 
conducted coordinated attacks against NATO servers and U.S governmental Web sites. 
As to the proliferation of Worm attacks, high profile incidents during 2001 
demonstrated that the development and use of such attack programs are evolving faster 
than previously recorded, about one every three months15, and that each new generation 
is being engineered to improve its repertoire of exploited security vulnerabilities, self-
autonomy, distribution/replication methodology, and destructive payloads. As to its 
potential impact on the larger Internet infrastructure, Code Red, for example, managed to 
infect some 359,000 hosts worldwide within a 14-hour period and was reported to have 
caused an estimated $2 billion dollars in damage, making it the second costliest single 
outbreak in Internet history16. Gone unchecked, experts widely believed that it could 
have set off an unprecedented Internet-based attack given that a principle component was 
to install a legion of sleeper attack daemons (programs) needed to conduct a distributed 
denial of service. 
 
                                                 
15 Edward Skoudis, Information Security Magazine," The Year of the Worm”, September 2001. 
16 Anna Saita, Information Security Magazine," Right Back Atcha”, September 2001. 
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B. DENIAL OF SERVICE  / DISTRIBUTED DENIAL OF SERVICE 
The primary objective of any Denial of Service (DoS) attack is to render a target 
computer, web-based service, or device useless by dominating its system resources. The 
direct impact will be to crash computer resources, block legitimate subscriber use of the 
Internet, and consume valuable bandwidth capacity to degrade overall Internet 
performance17. In the grand scheme, any device with an IP address or connection to a 
network infrastructure, to include wireless and mobile phone platforms, becomes 
vulnerable to attack. Particularly menacing is the conceivable threat that an attack aimed 
at the major IP based routers and IXPs, described earlier, could render large segments of 
the Internet inaccessible. 
 The distinguishing characteristic of a DoS attack is that it originates from a single 
machine. This type of attack often holds an asymmetric advantage in that even relatively 
older PC and modem technology can still be used to disable faster and more sophisticated 
machines, networks, or devices. Conversely, the Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) 
attack leverages the Internet’s distributed architecture and some segment of the millions 
of interconnected computers that reside on it in the same basic techniques. In the case of 
the February 2000 attack already mentioned, some of the effected sites were receiving 
levels of traffic measured in the gigabits per second range.  
While the ultimate effect on the target system is the same under DoS and DDoS, a 
DDoS is considered significantly more serious in that the malicious traffic originates 
from multiple machines over the wire versus originating from a single machine. 
Consequently, DDoS attacks are much faster at achieving desired levels of impact against 
the entire infrastructure as well as being much more difficult to defend against or isolate. 
Coupled with the accelerated deployment of “always-on”, high-bandwidth access 
technologies such as DSL and cable modem, the frequency of DoS style attacks have 
already increased as much as 60 percent over the past three years18. 
 
 
                                                 
17 The world wide web security frequently asked questions,  http://www3.org/security/faq. 
18 Source: Computer Security Institute, "2001 CSI/FBI Computer Crime and Security Survey", Vol. 
VII, Spring 2001. 
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C. DENIAL OF SERVICE IMPLEMENTATION 
Malicious hackers generally employ DoS using one of two techniques to assault 
the underlying TCP/IP or UDP/IP protocol standards that provide the basis for data 
exchange [Ref. 12]. The first, labeled flooding attacks (ICMP, SYN, SMURF, 
FRAGGLE (UDP)), seek to quantitatively flood the target system with spurious Internet 
Protocol (IP) packet traffic with the intent to overload targeted network servers. 
Legitimate data traffic in route to the target system is not directly prevented. Instead, 
legitimate packets become the smallest fraction of the total traffic processed. The 
processing of legitimate traffic becomes relegated to the background and thus service is 
denied. The second technique, generally referred to as a logic-based attack (PING of 
Death, Chargen, Teardrop), exploits known software bugs resident on the operating 
system (OS) of the target system to take it offline, crash, or reboot. Despite the varying 
methodologies available using these types of techniques, in the larger sense, the primary 
emphasis to be appreciated is that any communication infrastructure attached to the 
Internet could be disrupted, even crippled, if not adequately defended. The specific 
methodologies are summarized to further develop an understanding of the characteristics 
underlying the attack.  
1. SYN-ACK/TCP-SYN Flooding  
Briefly, the Transmission Control Protocol (TCP) is the primary transport 
mechanism used to provide the guarantee of a reliable connection between two hosts. To 
do so, TCP makes use of a three-way handshake to establish or terminate an active 
session. To initiate the process, a client machine will transmit a synchronization packet 
(SYN) to the desired server. In turn, the server will acknowledge that request using a 
SYN-ACK packet. Then, in an attempt to ensure unambiguous agreement, the client will 
acknowledge the server’s acknowledgement with its own ACK packet.  The TCP-SYN 
flood attack techniques are designed to leverage this handshake process to effect a denial 
of service condition. By initiating only the initial handshake portion of the session and 
not responding to the acknowledgment sequence, the SYN-ACK technique forces 
numerous half-open TCP connections that results in the victim server storing larger 
numbers of acknowledgement packets in its queue. Eventually, the queue will reach a 
state of overflow such that its capacity to issue any new, legitimate, acknowledgements 
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will become disabled. The typical targets of this technique are web servers and traffic 
load-balancers deployed in concert with firewalls, servers, or IDSs. 
2. SMURF   
A SMURF attack is a technique that leverages the availability of amplifier 
machines to multiply the total amount of traffic a target site will receive. Specifically, the 
attack will take advantage of the direct broadcast addressing mechanism of a network by 
spoofing the target machine’s IP address and broadcasting Internet Control Message 
Protocol (ICMP) ping requests (ICMP_ECHO_REQUEST) packets across multiple 
subnets, if configured. Upon receipt, all machines that are connected to the subnet will 
reply to these requests and forward them to the intended target of the attack. This process 
will serve to congest or clog the victim’s network resources with bogus packets making it 
unavailable to legitimate traffic. The intelligence in this particular attack profile is that all 
intermediate systems will contribute to overall congestion, thus magnifying a DoS, as 
each is drawn into the echo-response cycle. It is believed that as much as half of all DoS 
attacks flood a victim’s site in this manner. SMURF attacks are possible against the full 
range of infrastructure components to include web servers, individual host machines, and 
routers. 
3. FRAGGLE / UDP 
Considered a derivative of the SMURF attack, FRAGGLE is a form of attack that 
exploits the connectionless delivery characteristics of the User Datagram Protocol (UDP) 
in that it has no inherent properties of flow control, ordered delivery of packets, or 
acknowledgements. As opposed to the SMURF attack, the FRAGGLE method will send 
UDP packets, vice ICMP packets, to the broadcast address using the forged source 
address of the intended target. A stereotypical attack might involve sending a series of 
UDP packets to the character generation (chargen) port on one host with the packet's 
source port set to echo on the same system or on another. After a connection is 
established between two UDP services on a network, excessive numbers of forged UDP 
broadcast packets between the two services will serve to consume all available bandwidth 
at the expense of further legitimate users. Chargen and echo are just two of the available, 
but considered non-essential, UDP-based diagnostic ports that can be used for debugging 
or maintenance purposes. 
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4. Teardrop 
IP packet data is normally disassembled or fragmented to gain greater efficiencies 
in the transmission process across the Internet. Each packet fragment is constructed to be 
identical to its original IP packet with the exception of an offset value that indicates 
which “bytes” of the original (whole) packet are included. The Teardrop technique 
exploits the IP vulnerability as it relates to the reassembly of packets and purposely 
injects packet fragments with overlapping offset values to impede the sequencing, or 
reassembly, process in the victim’s machine. 
5. PING of Death/ Oversized Packet 
This type of attack exploits known bugs in the TCP/IP implementations of some 
operating systems to cause complete crash, reboots or system hangs.  Specifically, this 
technique uses the ping utility to send packets that exceed the maximum 65,536 bytes of 
data allowed under the IP specification. While still a capable form of attack against older 
operating systems (OS), this particular exploit has largely been rendered ineffective 
through the normal course of OS replacement or software upgrades. 
 
D. DISTRIBUTED DENIAL OF SERVICE IMPLEMENTATION 
The fundamental attack techniques underlying a DDoS are the same as described 
above for a DoS. The use of tools to effect a distributed denial of service, generally, 
paralleled the transition to the larger bandwidth capability within the Internet itself. 
Preference for its use can also be viewed as part of the larger escalation response cycle to 
directly counter the commercial deployments of firewalls, load balancers, and large 
server farms by subscriber networks. The primary difference between DoS and DDoS, 
however, hinges on the degree of sophistication as well as the notions of scale, speed, and 
complicity in the attack model.  
A DDoS is generally implemented by a malicious hacker by first identifying a 
network or number of non-secure host computers by the process of scanning large ranges 
of network IP blocks looking for specific, but commonly known vulnerabilities such as 
wu-ftpd, RPC services, and others. Once a vulnerable system is identified, each is 
implanted with either a zombie program or a specific handler (client) program. Both 
programs are used to facilitate the hacker’s takeover or control of impregnated “third 
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party” systems that will be used to coordinate attacks against future targets, the intended 
victim of a DDoS.  
Zombie machines, also known as z-bots or slaves, are utilized to directly attack 
the target machines while the handler/client system is used principally as the intermediate 
control station. As Figure 5 depicts, the handler machines are used to activate subordinate 
zombie machines in a decentralized command and control fashion using techniques 
ranging from simple UDP packet based commands to the more sophisticated TCP (telnet, 
ssh) and ICMP (ECHO_REPLY) based commands. In most instances, the process to 
establish and execute the army of z-bot attackers is fully automated such that much of 
routine work of scanning for vulnerable hosts, installing the daemon (attack program), 
concealing the intrusion, establishing peering relations are being accomplished through 
scripts, Trojan Horse, or self replicating worm applications. 
Future trends expected in DDoS tools suggest that besides improving the 
graphical user interfaces, to address ease of use issues for hackers, more subtle 
approaches are being pursued to create a slower degradation, vice outright denial, of 
service in an effort to complicate the discovery of attacks by intrusion defense systems at 
the victim site [Ref 9]. The logic being that since detection technologies generally operate 
using pre-established thresholds, forming attacks that arrive below such levels could 
delay or outright subvert automated response mechanisms. Other subtle modifications to 
current implementations suggest that greater emphasis is also being placed on the stealth 
qualities of handlers and zombie programs to make them more invisible to signature 
based scanners. This is evidenced by wide spread use/installation of rootkits as part of the 
payload that can be used to hide the presence of programs, files, or connections. 
In terms of command and control, hackers have also begun to deploy tools that 
have, in addition to the aforementioned adjustments, placed a primary emphasis on 
encryption to mask the communication channels between master-handler and handler-
zombie programs. Subsequent versions of attack tools are envisioned to “pulse” on a 
periodic basis in the form of short encrypted bursts to further complicate the monitor and 
detection efforts.  
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  Because much of the DoS coding is still based on cross pollination between 
existing publicly-accessible programs or as a result of incremental adjustments to the 
available coding, the profiles of known hacker toolkits such as Trin00, Tribal Flood 
Network (TFN), TFN2K and Stacheldraht are detectable by open source scanning tools.  
 
Figure 6.   Basic Topology and Communication Path of DDoS [From Ref 12] 
 
  
E. WORMS AND ASSOCIATED HYBRIDS 
 Computer systems have long been vulnerable to the threat posed by a family of 
malicious code known formally as a virus −described here simply as a program designed 
to spread from one file or computer instruction set to another on the same machine in 
order to modify or corrupt data. Although capable of wide spread damage in their own 
right, viruses have an inherent self-limitation in that they require some level of user 
interactivity to activate and sustain its lifecycle. Alternatively, a distinct subset of 
malicious code known as a worm poses an even greater threat to a network of computer 
systems.  
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A worm’s distinct characteristic is that it has the ability to propagate without the 
help of any user interaction. Designed with a functional emphasis placed on self-
replication, worms are engineered simply for the purpose of spreading themselves as 
widely as possible across a network of machines. While knowledge of their existence or 
use is not new19, their true impact has only recently been realized because of the size and 
ubiquitous interconnectivity of the Internet. In terms of threat to Internet security today, 
worm developers have enhanced the malignant behavior of their creations by bundling 
sophisticated distributed attack and remote control tools as part of their payload. While in 
the process of compromising thousands of vulnerable hosts, attackers are now exploiting 
the inherent self-replicating properties of worms to spread their tools and then use their 
victims in amplified attacks in such schemas as distributed password cracking, system 
vulnerability scanning, and the aforementioned denial of service attacks. This unique 
combination of replication and payload is what has lead some analyst within the anti-
virus vendor community to the conclusion that over the next decade, worms will surpass 
the virus as the major malicious threat to any computer system or device attached to the 
Internet.  
If not troubling enough for end users, the underpinnings of internet transmission 
and core routing will be increasingly jeopardized. As in the case of the Code Red 
incident, transmission capacity became the indirect victim of the worm's rapid 
propagation in that large allocations of bandwidth were consumed simply due to heavy 
vulnerability scanning and mass e-mailings. In a preliminary report sponsored by the 
Renesys Corporation, analysts concluded that there existed a "strong correlation between 
the propagation of Code Red and Nimda with a period of core internet router instability" 
most likely resulting from a combination of router CPU overload and the numerous 




                                                 
19 Robert T. Morris is credited with authoring/releasing the first Internet worm as early as 1988 that 
infected an estimated 6000 computers.  
20 J. Crowe, A. Ogielski, B. Premore, Y. Yuan, "Global Routing Instability During Code Red II and 
Nimda Worm Propagation: Preliminary Report", Renesys Corporation, September 2001. 
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F. WORM IMPLEMENTATION 
By definition, a worm is a form of malicious code that has the ability to propagate 
without any assistance from the computer user. Within the network environment, worm 
code is able to sustain propagation by either leveraging the transport capabilities of a 
communications service like e-mail in which it can attach itself to self- generated 
outgoing traffic or by making use of some arbitrary protocol such as HTTP, FTP, IRC or 
TCP/IP to probe and spread to other connected systems. Once received, execution is 
generally achieved through one of three methodologies engineered within the design of 
the code. The basic launch methods include: self-launch, user-launched, and hybrid.  
1. Self-launch Method  
A worm that propagates using the self-launch method exploits some particular 
vulnerability of the host machine operating system or installed applications to enable the 
worm to execute automatically once introduced to a new platform. The unique 
characteristic of this type is that a human user does not need to execute anything. For 
example, the worm may append itself to an available executable within the operating 
system that is used during the boot process.  
2. User-launch Method  
A worm that employs a user-launch method requires a user's intervention or 
action to trigger execution of a supplanted payload. This particular method usually takes 
advantage of our susceptibility to social engineering techniques that exploit human 
curiosity. For example, a user is convinced to open an infected e-mail attachment in 
hopes of receiving a reward or prize. Similarly, the worm may append its code to all 
HTML files within a web server directory in an effort to infect visiting web browsers. 
3. Hybrid Method.   
Hybrid worms use design features of both self and user-launch types. First 
executed by some user action on one host, the worm then automatically spreads to other 
systems via a given exploit and becomes activated through a variety of means like an 




G.  WORM ATTACK MODEL 
 In the general sense, the propagation mechanisms simply automate the network 
attack model, reflected in Figure 7, which has been used by human intruders for years to 
exploit computer technology. For example, the post incident analysis of the Nimda 
Worm, authored by the SANS Institute, illustrated four distinct modes of propagation to 
infect hosts running any version of the Windows operating system [Ref 12].  
First, the Nimda Worm conducted automated scans of the Internet IP domain 
space to locate vulnerable web servers. Then, employing any of approximately one 
hundred known system exploits, such as an IIS transversal technique or backdoor 
program left resident from a previous worm infection, Nimda remotely downloaded a 
copy of its program from a previously compromised host. Second, having the capability 
to extract listings from a user’s address book, the worm was able to self-generate mass e-
mailings with an infected attachment in a manner that harnessed the power of social 
engineering to takeover where technical means fell short. Third, if successfully installed 
on a web server, the worm leveraged weaknesses within the HTTP service protocol by 
implanting visiting web-browsers with an infected executable program that ran 
automatically within certain versions of the popular Internet Explorer web browser21. As 
in the case of e-mail exploits, hijacking the legitimate protocols like HTTP provides the 
worm an additional route through firewall perimeters. Fourth, the worm would search out 
and append itself to any executable file within an accessible network share drive on the 







                                                 
21 Security Focus virus news bulletin, “Toward More CyberSecurity in 2002” by Alex Salkever, Jan 




Figure 7.   Network Attack Model 
 
 
 While Nimda is but one of many recently identified Internet-based worms, 
detailed here to provide granularity, the various propagation techniques (or combination 
thereof) consistently appear within the current generation of worm releases. The 
distinguishing characteristic of a particular worm, however, is a function of its author's 
choice to exploit one vulnerability over another, previously identified or otherwise.   
In the larger context of Internet security, worm technology exposes several 
contributing factors that have exacerbated the weakness of relying solely on the 
subscriber-centric security approach.   First, for a myriad of reasons that range from 
apathy to overload, administrators of both large and small networks have failed to keep 
pace with system updates despite the availability of software patches to eliminate known 
vulnerabilities and adequate foreknowledge of existing threats22. This was particularly 
evident in the mass infection rates experienced in the aftermath of Code Red II, 
approximately twenty-nine days after patches were made publicly available following the 
Code Red I worm release. Second, the ubiquitous nature of e-mail as a propagation 
mechanism has dramatically increased the rate of infection. Levels of exposure that 
previously took months or weeks to propagate are now possible in minutes and seconds. 
Once an e-mail account is exposed, individuals continually demonstrate their 
                                                 
22 ComputerWorld Magazine, “Study: Constant Security Fixes Overwhelming IT Managers” by Dan 
Verton, November 30, 2001.   
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susceptibility to even the most basic social engineering techniques that serve to 
perpetuate the infection cycle. Third, worm technology, coupled with an abundance of 
freely available attack code, has dramatically reduced the period in which the anti-virus 




Threats to computer systems can come from many sources.  While much of the 
focus of security efforts has been on addressing issues of insider abuse, there presently 
exist the means to leverage the interconnectivity and transmission capacity against other 
networks as well as the Internet infrastructure itself.  Two of the more serious threats of 
distributed denial of service and self-propagating worm were presented with some detail 
to provide the reader with an understanding of the attack methodologies and to illustrate 
the increasing ineffectiveness of the subscriber-centric security approach as the primary 
means to achieve defense in depth.  
While the techniques were discussed in the context of current capabilities (known 
attacks) that remain effective today, the identification of trends and projected capabilities 
highlight that effectively countering future attacks will become increasingly more 
difficult should the onus remain on the edge networks and individual subscribers.  
Due to the highly interactive nature of the various systems and networks, it is 
recognized that no single system can be made adequately secure unless all the 
interconnected systems are made secure. Given that a substantial number of edge systems 
remain vulnerable for a variety of reasons, it is necessary for defensive mechanisms, such 
as those identified in Chapter II, to be implemented deeper within the infrastructure to 
isolate compromised systems attempting to generate malicious traffic. If released into the 
Internet, the ability of even the more security hardened systems to counter a combined 
attack by multiple end systems is greatly reduced or negated thoroughly. Within the 
context of the denial of service and worm capabilities identified here, Chapter IV will 
describe some technologies and tools that are currently available, but not widely used 
within the ISP community, that can strengthen the existing layered defense security 
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IV. ISP CENTRIC APPROACH 
A. INTRODUCTION 
As mentioned, one of the more critical aspects of assuring the requisite security 
for the Internet is a need to identify the appropriate entities that are in the best position to 
translate security concepts into action across the distributed infrastructure. Historically, 
the onus for that security has fallen singly on the shoulders of the participating 
subscribers or edge networks in a manner that best meets their own operating 
requirements. Given that initial use of the media was voluntary in nature, the notion of 
acceptable behavior or a self-imposed etiquette by participants was sufficient to mitigate 
most malicious activity.  
Today, participation within the Internet is no longer considered voluntary and in 
many cases deemed mission critical to the needs of commerce, society, and governments 
at large. At the same time, as Chapter III indicated, new levels of ubiquitous 
interconnectivity, coupled with an abundance of system vulnerabilities inherent in 
computing products, now makes it possible for the growing population of malicious users 
to leverage millions of connected hosts against any element in a manner that jeopardizes 
the Internet's overall reliability and continued availability. As previous high profile 
incidents have demonstrated, the subscriber-centric security paradigm has been unable to 
effectively respond to the distributed nature of the DoS and Worm threats despite our vast 
knowledge base of vulnerabilities and customer premise countermeasures. The limiting 
factor to the impact such threats have had to date has been more a result of poor 
execution on the part of less capable adversaries rather than a triumph of vigilant network 
administrators. 
Commensurate with the Internet's evolution, however, Internet Service Providers 
(ISP) have emerged as a dominant influence in expanding the infrastructure as well as 
services available to its end users. Acting as the central gateway for all but the smallest 
fraction of internet users, the Internet Service Providers command a functional advantage, 
by way of their access, core distribution networks, and peering/service level agreements, 
to exert a level of measured restraint over its subscribers in an effort to reestablish the 
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boundaries of acceptable use, most of which are already identified as best practices. More 
importantly, ISPs retain a unique positional advantage to globally enforce the mechanics 
of appropriate use that no single participating network can exact on any other network 
segment.  
Given the fact that there presently exists no single technology to guarantee 
absolute security for every computing situation, the widely accepted and necessary 
concept of a layered defense has evolved within the network security environment to help 
mitigate the effects of malicious activity. Most of these mechanisms, summarized in 
Chapter II, that comprise the layered defense are inconsistently applied across networks 
or often misconfigured and/or unpatched to some degree. While most of the technologies 
to be suggested within the ISP centric security approach implement the same principles 
and security mechanism in use today (firewalls, anti-virus, intrusion detection), the 
fundamental difference is that the advances in technology have now made it possible to 
employ the techniques at the internet-work level sufficient to match the available rates of 
transmission. Coupled with a unifying organizational context emerging from the 
managed service provider business model, an ISP-centric security approach offers the 
benefit of mitigating the threat’s advantage of scale once released into the infrastructure. 
This section will discuss four enabling technologies that provide ISPs with the internet-
work level tools to better mitigate the effects of denial of service and geometric growth 
attacks, most of which have recently been made available.   
 
B. THE SECURITY POLICY ENFORCEMENT POINT 
Although the layered defense approach is universally accepted as the means to 
achieve the highest degree of protection in today's environment, all subscribers do not 
consistently apply the necessary components to achieve the requisite levels. In essence, 
all organizations implement a security posture based on their unique risk management 
analysis that often, in terms of Internet security, fails to strengthen the "system" as a 
whole. This has been most apparent in the case of individual subscribers who have begun 
to migrate from traditional dial-up service to the higher capacity broadband service such 
as DSL and cable. With traditional dial-up access, subscribers generally exhibit a low 
profile in terms of their Internet presence. When initiating a connection, users are 
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assigned a random IP address from a large address pool provided by their ISP and their 
connections are typically short in duration. Somewhat analogous to a small fish in a big 
pond, dial-up users could assume they were less at risk and avoid using a common 
defense mechanism such as a desktop firewall. Alternatively, broadband access is viewed 
as a higher profile in that, generally, users are assigned a fixed IP address and operate 
using a high bandwidth, always on connection. Since the vast majority of ISPs do not 
require subscribers to deploy any of the perimeter defenses as a term of service, hackers 
can easily detect their presence and have a much longer opportunity to exploit potential 
vulnerabilities. 
As part of the movement to generate business revenue, ISPs have been leveraging 
newer technologies to deliver a greater number of valued added services to subscribers. 
Virtual Private Network (VPN) service is one such example that provides a secure 
communication path between two end points over the existing public (non-secure) 
Internet infrastructure. One specific class of technology, however, that has emerged is a 
service provisioning platform or security policy enforcement point (SPEP) designed with 
the intention to provide a more diverse security feature set and IP services from the point 
of network access. Two such platforms are the Nortel Networks Shasta 5000 Broadband 
Service Node (BSN) and the Lucent Technologies SpringTide 7000 that can be deployed 
across the range of service provider networks, commercial enterprise networks, and 
university settings. While these two platforms are vendor specific products, both 
demonstrate similar offerings that will be singularly highlighted within a context of 
mitigating DoS and worm propagation to illustrate the application of the ISP-centric 
security approach. As shown in Figure 8, the SPEP is deployed at the service providers 
network edge. It was designed with a functional emphasis to provide a centralized access 
point that can aggregate all the various access technologies typically found within the 
ISPs access network; DSL, cable, dial-up, ATM, Frame Relay, and wireless. The 
principle relevance in the ISP-centric security environment is that the SPEP enables the 
ISP to apply a range of service (security enhancing) policies to a large number of 
individual subscribers through a single interface. In terms of scaling that supports the 
tiered infrastructure of the ISP community, the SPEP is also designed to allow a multiple 
of other ISPs to use the same node yet retain separate address space to distribute the 
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service policies to their client base. This is made possible by the creation of what Nortel 
calls a “context or virtual router” scheme. Figure 8 illustrates the concept best. ISP A is 
considered the owner of the SPEP and owns the underlying backbone infrastructure 
leading to the Internet.  ISP B, potentially a tier 3 “reseller”, is provided a distinct context 
from which security services can be distributed to its respective clients. In terms of 
security, the specific feature sets of interest that will be outlined include: firewall; anti-
spoof filtering; Network Address Translation; Quality of Service (QoS) as a traffic 
management tool; and, to a limited extent, web steering [Ref 14]. 
 
 







With a level of specificity that accommodates tens of thousands of individual 
subscribers per node, the SPEP provides a state-aware firewall technology at the point of 
access into the ISP backbone network. Deployed as a network-based firewall, vice a 
customer premise device, the ISP can employ all the commonly used principles of packet 
filtering and session level management described in the Chapter II to enforce security 
policy and block malicious traffic before it can be released into either the ISP core 
network or outbound into the subscriber network. In terms of utility and management, 
this capability allows an ISP to create policy statements customized to individual 
subscribers or groupings of subscribers using preformatted templates. Each firewall 
instance (per subscriber) is able to track the bi-directional application flows that use both 
static TCP and UDP ports as in the case of HTTP or protocols that use dynamic ports 
such as streaming media and FTP. This would allow for the filtering of unsolicited 
packets into the subscriber’s network/host. More broadly, the advantage of this approach 
is that it allows ISP to enforce aspects of “best practices” that may have otherwise been 
inconsistently applied within the subscriber-centric model. As opposed to the situation in 
which the subscriber base deploys a variety of vendor specific firewalls, the SPEP allows 
ISPs to provide higher levels of customer support using the managed security service 
paradigm.  
2. Anti-spoofing (Ingress/Egress Filtering) 
Despite the presence of firewalls, hackers have always managed to exploit some 
known or unknown system vulnerabilities to gain access to computer resources within 
networks. Once penetrated, spoofing attacks are commonly used to generate legitimate or 
illegitimate source-addressed traffic that can bypass the perimeter firewall packet-
checking processes.  In this regard, the SPEP incorporates features to create subscriber 
specific anti-spoof policy profiles that can filter both inbound and outbound traffic to 
block source address spoof attacks. While the techniques of egress and ingress filtering 
are common defense mechanisms, described more completely in Chapter II, they have 
traditionally been deployed at the subscriber’s edge router only. If a number of hosts 
within a particular network have been infected with a zombie program, the edge router 
represents a single point of vulnerability that must deal with the aggregated flood traffic. 
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By pushing the anti-spoofing and filtering policy closer to the individual subscriber level, 
the SPEP approach prevents an individual host from releasing forged source traffic. 
Having greater top-sight of the traffic that does enter the infrastructure, the SPEP concept 
contributes favorably to the ability to trace and isolate the source of malicious activity. 
3. Network Address Translation 
In general, Network Address Translation (NAT) is a mechanism to translate 
internal network IP addresses into a single unique IP address. It was designed with the 
intent to more efficiently manage the dwindling IP address space pool inherent under the 
IPv4 specification. However, NAT also has an additive value in terms of security in that 
it is an effective means to hide the internal (private) IP addresses from the public internet 
field of view. Its principle security strength is that no communication from the outside is 
allowed to reach into the network unless it is first initiated by the internal address.  To 
capture this unique benefit, the BSN and Springtime 7000 are designed to internally 
support NAT down to the individual subscriber IP address. Migrating this functionality to 
the SPEP, from the subscriber’s network, allows the level of “reachability” necessary for 
subscriber specific security profiles to be effective.  
4. Quality of Service (QoS) 
The Internet works within a basic operating concept described as  “best-effort” 
delivery to reliably distribute packetized data between two end points. During this 
process, however, no commitment is made on the part of the infrastructure to guarantee 
appropriate levels of bandwidth capacity or timeliness of delivery (latency) for the 
transmission. In order to better support real-time network services, QoS emerged as 
mechanism to manage the prioritization and efficient scheduling of traffic to control 
congestion and delay. For example, streaming/multi-media applications such as live 
audio intuitively requires an orderly sequence of arrival and timeliness in delivery to 
provide the user with an intelligible message that mirrors the originators oration. Should 
portions of the traffic arrive out of order or excessively late, the message would sound 
fragmented and incoherent by the receiver. 
 As a by-product of this scheduling and prioritization function, QoS mechanisms 
can have a security enhancing character especially in terms of mitigating denial of service 
and worm propagation. For instance, a common attribute of DoS is one of bandwidth 
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consumption resulting from packet floods initiated by the zombie network. QoS can be 
used as a traffic management process to restrict the amount of traffic (shaping) that any 
one zombie can broadcast should some predefined threshold be exceeded. Similarly, the 
traffic can be tagged as low priority (traffic policing) to be dropped further downstream 
in favor of preferred or legitimate data packets.  
Accordingly, the SPEP concept incorporates the mechanism to employ and 
enforce QoS policies down to the individual subscriber. Using class-based traffic policing 
to optimize the backbone network, ISPs can define the types, rate, and volume of type 
traffic an individual subscriber can introduce into the core infrastructure that has been 
pre-established by way of a contractual Service Level Agreement. In particular, the BSN 
supports policing categories based on committed rate, committed burst size, peak rate, 
amd peak rate burst size thresholds within the four Differential Service Assured 
Forwarding (DiffServ AF) classes, used as a means to allocate forwarding resources such 
as buffer size and bandwidth of a DiffServ domain node. [Ref 15] For example, a 
subscriber’s HTTP server traffic may be assigned as an AF-4 class and a committed rate 
of 10 kbps. This characterization could indicate the HTTP traffic is afforded a guaranteed 
20 percent of available bandwidth for the contracted committed rate. Exceeding any 
predefined threshold, the traffic can be dropped outright, queued using selectable weight 
values, or marked for prioritization. Using a worm infection as an example, HTTP traffic 
associated with its propagation phase would likely exceed the committed rate and be 
marked for a drop action before release into Internet, thus minimizing the impact upon 
bandwidth availability until further incident response procedures could be taken.  
In terms of traffic shaping, the SPEP can be used to similarly enforce a 
customized policy profile that manages traffic sent into the subscriber’s network/host to 
provide rate "guarantees" or traffic priority specific to individual application flows. 
Consider the case of the worm using e-mail as the propagation mechanism, using traffic 
shaping to lower the priority of less mission critical applications like SMTP could be 
helpful in dampening the indirect resource consumption that results from the mass 
mailing until further action could be taken.  
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5. Web Steering 
Web steering is a functional mechanism that allows an ISP or enterprise network 
to dynamically redirect a client’s HTTP request for the purposes of funneling users to 
specific content. Instead of connecting to an intended web page, the session request is 
diverted to a preferred proxy cache web server. This process can be used for a variety of 
reasons, but some of the more common examples include the network authority steering 
employees to the host company’s homepage upon initial login, an ISP directing 
customers to a service selection page that can be used to request a new value-added 
service, or a web host organization directing clients to a periodic customer service 
survey. Nortel's BSN also provides for this capability, defined as their Personal Content 
Portal. While this feature has some explicit business related applications, the ISP 
community can leverage this same functionality to reduce the spread of malicious code 
that is often embedded within subverted web pages. For example, part of the Nimda 
propagation profile was to infect the HTML files on a compromised web server. 
Similarly, hackers routinely embed Trojan Horse programs within subverted web pages. 
In most cases, incident response processes are slow in making repairs to compromised 
servers before large numbers of unsuspecting users visit their sites. As national and 
private organizations begin to track and maintain databases of infections close to real-
time, it is conceivable in an ISP-centric model to push compiled listings of compromised 
servers to service providers in a manner that they can rapidly invoke HTTP request filters 
and automatically steer subscribers away from dangerous areas. Web steering could be 
used somewhat analogous to the emergency broadcast system over television and radio, 
where programming across all channels is interrupted and viewers are alerted or directed 
to safe harbor during times of crisis.    
 
C. MITIGATING E-MAIL AS A PROPAGATION MECHANISM 
Electronic mail (e-mail) has effectively become the indispensable communication 
mechanism in use over the Internet. E-mail is often cited as the number one reason 
subscribers elect to join the internet community.  In an effort to subvert many of the static 
perimeter defense mechanisms used throughout networks, however, worm/virus 
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developers have increasing leveraged e-mail and their attachments as one of the more 
effective propagation mechanisms to distribute malicious code.  
While many ISPs host mail services for their subscribers, the bulk of the 
infrastructure still resides within the customer networks. This architectural approach was 
reasonable during the Internet’s beginning, given that most networks developed internally 
before attaching to the global community. Further, this approach also lends itself to 
providing edge networks with the highest degree of autonomy to configure services 
commensurate with their own requirements. To guard their systems from the outside, 
most universities, small business, and enterprise networks deploy firewalls and e-mail 
servers within a “Demilitarized Zone” similar to that shown in Figure 9, to protect their 
internal networks, yet permit internal users to send and receive e-mail. Virus scanning 
can be accomplished at either the Internet facing firewall or within the mail server 
depending on a given architecture. The advantage of these techniques is that it provides 
scalability for the network in that multiple firewalls, servers, and scanning mechanisms 
can be added to manage network traffic loads for improved performance.  
The disadvantages to this implementation, in terms of global security are three 
fold. From the anti-virus management perspective, the sheer volume of networks that are 
supported by virus product vendors creates the situation in which response time to deliver 
frequent signature updates provides sufficient windows of opportunity in which new 
viruses can be introduced into the system or existing viruses can achieve large infection 
rates. This situation is further exacerbated in the home subscriber market as anti-virus 
vendors attempt to keep pace at the individual desktop level. While vendors have 
responded by increasing the level of automation to push/pull updates, as in the case of 
Symantec Corporation’s LiveUpdate feature, subscribers retain the discretion of enabling 
this functionality or establishing the periodicity of updates. If inconsistently applied 
across even a small percentage of attached networks/desktops, e-mail propagation retains 
the advantage of exploiting large portions of the Internet as a whole. 
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Figure 9.   Firewall Deployment within a Demilitarized Zone (DMZ) 
 
From the network-level perspective, anti-virus scanning technology can be 
employed at the firewall, the server proxy/gateway, or both. For networks that employ 
scanning at the firewall, all inbound and outbound data are intercepted and scanned, or 
blocked outright. The advantage of this scheme is that no additional server assets are 
required to implement protection and responsibility to manage each network client is 
alleviated. The disadvantage is that the firewall can quickly become a single point of 
vulnerability and bottleneck in terms of network performance. To reduce loading, the 
common practice becomes to relax policy constraints regarding outbound traffic that is 
assumed to be trusted while concentrating resources against untrustworthy inbound 
traffic. Again, given that exposure to viruses/worms can be achieved by a multitude of 
other methods, the Internet becomes vulnerable to large outbreaks of malicious code. In 
the case where Intelligent Scanning Architecture (ISA)23 is employed (see Figure 10) 
within medium and larger sized networks to mitigate the performance penalties of the 
firewall implementation, common practice is also to relax policy regarding outbound 
                                                 
23 A variation of scanning that incorporates a process that allows the firewall to offload suspicious 
traffic to a separate a proxy virus scanning sever while letting “legitimate” traffic to proceed. 
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traffic flow. Further, the deployment of additional components within networks again 
places increased burden of scale as anti-virus vendors attempt to distribute updates. 
 
Figure 10.   Representative Intelligent Scanning Architecture 
 
 Alternatively, maturation of virus scanning technology now makes it possible for 
an ISP to deploy sufficient processing capability to handle the volume of e-mail traffic 
being generated before viruses can reach subscriber systems [Ref 16]. Two examples 
include EarthLink and AT&T WorldNet. In the latter case, AT&T has recently deployed 
the BrightMail Anti-Virus/Spam solution suite that is designed to protect the integrity and 
security of e-mail systems and individual accounts deeper within the Internet’s 
distribution network24. Fundamentally, this technology works similar to other anti-virus 
scanning products. It employs both signature-based filters and heuristic-scanning 
techniques against all transmitted SMTP traffic, attachments, and various encoding 
schemes (MIME, UUENCODE, BinHex) for possible viruses. If detected, the entire 
message can be temporarily stored and disinfected before forwarding to its original 
                                                 
24 The BrightMail solution suite is also marketed for enterprise networks. According to BrightMail’s 
press release dated August 7, 2001, AT&T is cited as one of the first Tier-1 ISPs to deploy this concept. 
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destination. Should other forms of malicious code, like a known Trojan Horse program, 
be detected, the attachment is deleted and the intended recipient notified. Although such 
systems provide a measure of protection against known "signatures", they cannot offer a 
simple and complete solution to the malicious code problem. The only known solutions 
for which there is scientific basis are systems that provide confidence of non-subversion 
and enforcement of protection domains. Lack of these systems force networks to be based 
upon the weaker security technologies discussed here. However, if e-mail scanning is 
deployed within the ISP distribution network, this approach can bolster overall internet 
security and offers the following advantages over subscribe network deployments. 
1. Early Warning 
As in the BrightMail example, an array of dedicated e-mail accounts disguised as 
regular accounts are placed across all the participating networks to act as early warning 
devices. The logic being similar to a deployed sensor network, these “probe accounts” are 
established to detect the early beginnings of a virus' propagation to allow backend 
support to analyze and distribute appropriate countermeasures before mass infection can 
occur.  BrightMail is jointly supported by Symantec to provide the virus definitions and 
scanning engine updates. Combined, the two organizations cooperate to provide the ISP 
with round the clock analysis of suspicious traffic and to deliver customized rule sets for 
disabling the attack.  
The integration of a backend support infrastructure becomes beneficial to the 
network as a whole in addressing newer generations of malicious code, typified by the 
emergence of polymorphic techniques. A virus spawned by a polymorphic worm may 
appear as an isolated instance to any one ISP edge-network administrator. The 
cooperative pairings between an ISP and an anti-virus vendor allows the ISP to take 
advantage of the expertise of a specialized organization that potentially has a view of 
activities across ISP boundaries. Relieved of the burden to coordinate updates to the 
hundred of thousands of end systems, the vendor response is reduced to a more 
manageable level. As the backend support is also a repository for infected traffic, the 
code can be made available for broader forensic evaluation to aide in post-incident 
investigation and legal prosecution. The importance of this capability cannot be 
understated given the expanded scope of recent cyber-related legislation (PATRIOT Act, 
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2001) that has created a closer binding of computer crime and national defense.  In 
contrast, anti-virus processes implemented strictly within subscriber networks tend to 
neglect this component of security and are generally excluded from the backend support 
infrastructure.   
2. Economy of Scale 
Deploying e-mail scanning technology along with the organizational focus within 
the ISP network serves to reduce the overall complexity of subscriber networks that must 
increasingly add more devices to match similar capabilities. Further, this approach lends 
itself to greater scalability in terms of security. For small additions to the server 
infrastructure, ISPs can distribute protection for a larger number of networks or 
individual subscribers. Obvious issues related to "single point of failure" can be 
addressed through availability and reliability mechanisms previous mentioned (load-
balancing, advanced switching, etc.). As virus scanning mechanisms become more 
centralized, the responsiveness of supporting vendors to expedite timely upgrades is 
improved while mitigating vulnerabilities resulting from improper configuration or less 
than perfect interoperability between devices. Recognizing that increased centralization 
will potentially bring with it an increased focus by hackers, continued efforts to deploy 
intrinsically secure "mail systems" would be even more critical.   
 
D.  DENIAL OF SERVICE APPLIANCE 
The internet environment is too complex to assume that all ISPs would uniformly 
opt for the solutions offered thus far, nor would it be consistent with the principle of 
layered defense to ensure adequate redundancy. Accordingly, the emergence of 
functional specific DoS appliances provides the ISP centric approach the ability to extend 
security deeper into the core infrastructure or the subscribers network. The DoS appliance 
is a unique technology that provides the monitoring, analysis, and response mechanism to 
enforce security within the network of core routers. From the ISP perspective, the 
availability of infrastructure add-on devices like that of Arbor Networks PeakFlow and 
Asta Networks’ Vantage System provide a means to conduct an additional level of 
network-wide analysis and DoS mitigation.  
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Both systems are comprised of a collection of sensors that are deployable 
alongside key routers to monitor the flow of possible DoS signature traffic. Using 
anomaly and signature-based scanning algorithms, these particular DoS appliances 
sample the traffic passing through a selected router rather than sit "in-line" between two 
routers. Once suspicious traffic is detected, the analysis is conducted to determine source 
and type of attack.  Passed relevant parameters, the enforcement mechanism within the 
appliance is capable of implementing a suitable policy filter recommendation to its 
associated router to block the DoS traffic, given the consent of the network administrator. 
Constraining the ability of the DoS appliance to deploy filters without an administrator's 
consent, however, is more a management issue rather than a technological barrier. The 
added value of these devices is that they provide redundant and distributed support to 
filter traffic as close to the flooding source as possible. 
 
E.  DISTRIBUTED FIREWALL 
The SPEP concept does provide a means to better compartmentalize the internet 
user space through the implementation of network-based security profiles. However, the 
advantages provided by the BSN or Springtime 7000 can be eroded given unique 
subscriber network topologies. NAT, deployed externally to the BSN, was one such 
example that could hamper the "reachability" of the BSN to deliver subscriber level 
protection given that its function is to hide internal IP addresses behind a single interface. 
To address this potential shortfall in protecting hidden hosts deeper within the defense 
perimeter, it is prudent for the ISP-centric solution to incorporate the concept of 
distributed firewall technologies for at least the medium to large size networks [Ref 17].  
One approach to deliver on the concept is the 3Com Embedded Firewall 
Architecture, provided by 3Com Corporation [Ref 18]. 3Com’s solution is comprised of a 
firewall functionality embedded within a network interface card (NIC) that acts as the 
security policy enforcement mechanism. The individual NIC's then interact with the 
Firewall Policy Server that centrally manages and distributes security policy within the 
architecture.  
The functional emphasis of the distributed firewall concept is that all security 
policy defined by an off board, central location is enforced locally at the individual hosts. 
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In the 3Com product, the enforcement mechanism is embedded within the NIC 
(hardware) to raise the level of tamper resistance and to ensure that the security 
mechanism remains “non-bypassable”.  Citing the inherent vulnerability of software 
based solutions that result from a codependent relationship between host operating 
system and security application, the 3Com design stresses an operating system 
independent approach. Further, by embedding the firewall on the NIC, the 3Com 
approach serves to ensure that the enforcement mechanism always remains available 
between the host and network. In terms of scale, a central policy server simplifies the 
practical burdens of policy management of the distributed architecture to push out both 
rule-based and role-based security policy. Unlike rule-based policies, role-based security 
policy is based on the rights and duties of a particular person/position within an 
organization.   
The 3Com Embedded Firewall Architecture is marketed as a subscriber-centric 
network security mechanism. However, its inherent centralized management capability 
does afford its application within the managed security service model. Because the BSN 
solution is outwardly focused to the subscriber networks, a similar implementation could 
be pursued by ISPs to protect their own internal networks to limit the potential of their 
hosts within the distribution network from being subverted and used to coordinate attacks 
against customer network resources. .  
 
F. SUMMARY 
In spite of the preparation and protective measures taken now at the subscriber's 
edge of the network, the problem of mitigating distributed denial of service and worm 
propagation requires a long-term centralized approach to ensure a higher level of uniform 
application. The Internet by design has created a level of ubiquitous interconnectivity and 
interdependency among computers that has exceeded the limits of a decentralized 
subscriber-centric security approach. By virtue of the Internet’s maturation as a system, 
security of each node attached depends on the security of all other nodes. The distributed 
nature of the threat clearly demonstrates the responsibility of computer users. The onus 
for individual subscribers and networks to remain engaged in terms of best practices is 
prudent.  But more importantly, the responsibility of the Internet Service Provider to 
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uniformly implement security deeper within the core infrastructure is demonstrated to be 
technologically viable.  Possessing both a positional and functional advantage as the 
central gateway to the Internet, ISPs have the ability to deploy and manage effective 
countermeasures for the escalating DoS and worm threats. Three infrastructure level 
technologies were introduced to illustrate the concept of an ISP-centric security approach 
that at some levels is already underway: the security policy enforcement point or service 
node concept to deliver customized IP services to edge networks; a centralized e-mail 
scanning architecture to address malicious code propagation before subscriber infection; 
and the deployment of DoS appliance technology within router networks to create 
communities of "good neighbors".   
The distributed nature of the attack technology, coupled with the high speed of 
propagation, demonstrates the requirement for distributed solutions that can be 
implemented at the internet level. Until security becomes intrinsic to the design, 
development, and deployment of all network-computing processes, equipment, etc., 
intermediate systems must be introduced to ensure the requisite levels of availability and 












IV. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
A. CONCLUSIONS 
One of the more critical issues facing the Internet is the increasing ease with 
which malicious users can disrupt the network's availability and overall reliability. 
Distributed denial of service attacks and self-propagating worms were examined in this 
study to illustrate their distributed approach to rapidly deliver attacks from multiple 
points to overwhelm conventional countermeasures. This condition occurs in large part 
because most, if not all, detection and mitigation processes take place at the subscriber's 
edge of the network instead of farther upstream. Even if the targeted network applies the 
correct filters at its perimeters, the Internet pipeline is full of illegitimate traffic, which 
prevents legitimate traffic from accessing resources. Many of the techniques that prove 
effective in combating availability attacks are inconsistently applied across all subscriber 
networks. In many respects, this inconsistency can be attributed to an overall change in 
the sophistication of the user base unable, or ill-equipped, to deal with the maintenance of 
insecure computing designs. 
 In response to the increasingly disruptive activity, ISPs have been called upon to 
voluntarily interpose additional controls within their networks to help mitigate the impact 
of availability attacks. Various types of filtering, intrusion scanning, load distribution, 
and quality of service mechanisms were identified to characterize the current mechanisms 
deployed by ISP's. While effective, these measures have also been inconsistently applied 
for a variety of reasons to include training, performance degradation, and a general 
reluctance to expend resources beyond the traditional context of interconnectivity 
brokers. As more mission-critical networks become the targets of sustained attack, it is 
generally assumed that ISPs will eventually face growing levels of exposure under 
liability and legislative pressure to embrace a centralized security approach. Given these 
conditions, this thesis discusses the concept of ISP-centric security to enhance the notion 
of security "defense in depth". 
The ISP community was shown to be essentially a three-tiered hierarchical system 
that continually seeks greater degrees of interconnectivity with other ISPs to leverage 
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access between providers. Beyond the technical implementations, interconnectivity is 
achieved through the mutually beneficial peering agreements that serve the purpose of 
characterizing the nature of the data exchange between providers. ISPs and other 
independent provider organizations have also expanded their scope of services to 
emphasize managed security (MSSP). While still in the initial stages of development, the 
MSSP concept demonstrates some of the functional advantages of outsourcing levels of 
security responsibility to the ISP as well as provides insight to the economic feasibility of 
a centralized approach.  
Four enabling technologies were discussed that can serve as the framework to 
better mitigate the threat by providing the ISP with the capability to uniformly enforce 
the recognized tenants of best practices and traffic management. 
The security policy enforcement point (SPEP) concept was identified as the 
centerpiece of the ISP-centric approach that acts as an enforcement device capable of 
imparting specific firewall, anti-spoofing, and network usage restrictions to individual 
subscribers before their traffic enters the Internet. The IP service node distributes the 
mitigation processes to all key access points under the governance of the ISP to achieve 
levels of security support unachievable today. At a minimum it greatly simplifies the 
tracking and tracing functions required to identify compromised hosts. The service node 
web-steering functionality was also illustrated to suggest a mechanism capable of 
minimizing the impact of compromised web-hosts to unsuspecting browsers.  
The uniform application of centralized e-mail scanning was proposed to help 
counter the trend toward e-mail capable virus attacks made increasingly more disruptive 
since being incorporated as a principle worm propagation mechanism. By absorbing e-
mail scanning  at the ISP level, one of the more prevalent propagation mechanisms can be 
thwarted outright or at a minimum slowed to allow more stringent measures to be 
implemented by the subscriber networks. In cooperation with the backend support 
infrastructure, the ISP approach can help to increase response efforts of the anti-virus 
community to distribute relevant updates currently burdened by large numbers of 
subscriber networks and individual hosts. 
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The Denial of Service Appliance was highlighted as a means to mitigate levels of 
attack traffic deeper within the service provider's core network. Consistent with the 
layered defense paradigm, the addition of DoS appliances that can be tuned for specific 
attack signatures and profiles allows ISP's to monitor and respond to traffic that leaks 
through other perimeter mechanisms.  
The use of distributed firewalls was proposed for two purposes. The service node 
and DoS appliance are employed as outwardly looking mechanisms to better control the 
subscriber's traffic. It is prudent to deploy the distributed firewall within the extensive 
service provider networks to ensure their systems are equally constrained from 
participating in denial of service attacks should they become subverted. Additionally, the 
ability of the service node to reach all hosts within a network may be undermined given 
unique subscriber topologies. The distributed firewall technology can be utilized as a 
means to augment an IP service node's capability for larger networks that are unable to 
adjust their configuration. 
An ISP-centric approach is suggested as an attempt to consolidate some of the 
more basic but effective mechanisms available today to combat the challenges posed by a 
distributed threat. A redesign of the fundamental computing infrastructure with 
intrinsically secure systems is not immediately available due to many, largely non-
technical, factors. The mechanisms discussed here are available today and would require 











B.  FUTURE RESEARCH 
This research illustrates the organizational and technical framework that can be 
used as the basis for an ISP centric approach. Further experimentation is needed to 
determine the robustness and efficiency of the architecture. In this regard, specific 
recommendations include: 
The technologies outlined in the ISP centric framework, such as the BSN, 
currently do not support mechanisms that allow for automated and coordinated response 
across ISP nodes. An examination of the technical issues surrounding the networking of 
the service node concept to apply adaptive policy filters across nodes in response to 
denial of service attacks is warranted given migration to even greater transmission 
speeds. 
Information was not available regarding the extent that military facilities 
functioning as ISPs are deploying these technologies, combined or in part. The design 
and implementation of the ISP-centric architecture, as described, within the NPS domain 
could provide the test bed for broader implementation across all military facilities. 
One of the central components of a distributed firewall architecture is the 
centralized policy server. As employed in the 3Com solution, the central policy server is 
a standalone device that coordinates and manages policy distribution to the individual 
network interface cards (NIC). An examination of the technical issues surrounding the 
integration of the SpringTime 7000 or Shasta BSN to assume the role of policy server for 
the NIC-based firewall could be pursued in order to reduce the level of network 
complexity and infrastructure needed to support both. 
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